

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR FORCE FELLOWS PROGRAM

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT:
A DISCONNECT BETWEEN NATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY AND FORCE STRUCTURE?

by

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Preface

The following thoughts and ideas are intended to provoke the reader into an uncomfortable intellectual and emotional state. The author pens this in an attempt to heighten social awareness of a significant emerging threat facing our beloved nation. A threat exists that has grown from the downing of civil air-carriers and the murder of athletes during international competition to what now may be viewed as an unprecedented assault on humanity.

Unfortunately, the world is still large enough that groups of individuals seeking to profit from the misery of others can still find refuge. Perhaps more importantly, some of the safe havens for these madmen, classified as terrorist, are the very countries that would, without remorse, resort to the terrorist use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) themselves.

The subject of countering the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the effect of terrorist use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the prevention of terrorist use of Weapons of Mass Destruction have been widely studied and written about. However, countering the effects or the consequences of a detonated and/or released weapon(s) has only recently been given much attention. Despite several warnings of the catastrophe to come, little has been done to develop and field a standing, on call force capable of mitigating the effects of such an attack.

The ultimate goal of this project is to identify with the past and look into the possibilities of the future. We, as a Nation, must review where we have come from and where we are going in our attempt to thwart the advances of sophisticated terrorists and

terrorist states. Make no mistake in the assumptions; the fiscal resources available and the cost to our constitutional freedoms to prevent a WMD terrorist attack exclude the possibility of complete prevention.

Thus, we must be prepared to counter the threat with a strategically developed doctrine, supporting an operationally controlled and tactically proficient force to mitigate the effects of a Weapon of Mass Destruction.

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
DISCLAIMER	ii
PREFACE	iii
Thesis:	ix
Background:	ix
TERRORIST ATTACKS IN AMERICA’S FUTURE?	1
NATURE OF THE ATTACKERS	8
WHO WOULD ATTACK AMERICA?	13
REALITY OF THE POSSIBLE	17
THE ROAD TO APPARENT UNPREPAREDNESS	20
THE ROAD TO RECOVERY	23
CURRENT DIRECTION	26
THE CURRENT CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT FORCE STRUCTURE	35
DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT	41
INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT	49
A FORCE DISCONNECT	52
Results of a Two-tiered Approach	59
The U.S. Military in CM?	60
WHY NOT LEAVE IT TO SOMEONE ELSE?	70
CONCLUSION	74
Mitigation Deterrence Philosophy:	74
Cost:	75
Criticality of time:	76
Temporal Distortion:	77
Ability to Train:	79

RECOMMENDATIONS	81
Closing Thought:	85

OL international news: London is devastated as thousands overwhelm Britain's medical facilities. In the apparent aftermath of a possible biological terrorist attack, the United Kingdom's capital is paralyzed. By noon today, over 1,000 Londoners had been transported to local hospitals suffering from some as yet unidentified ailment. Medical authorities are either baffled or unwilling to identify the cause of the widespread infections.



On the condition of anonymity one local medical doctor postulated, "We've not begun to see the worst of it, this may reach into the tens of thousands". Echoing that thought, insiders concede Parliament fears the magnitude of the attack may be insurmountable. While no fatalities have been officially reported, several sources indicate many older and several younger victims are near death.

In what's being deemed "precautionary measures," the majority of the city of London is under an apparent quarantine. London's Heathrow Airport, the major rail systems, and ports have been completely shutdown. In an unprecedented move, the British government has ordered all international carriers to remain in place. Alarming, the government has mobilized the military to enforce this "precautionary quarantine."



Fears have begun to rise rapidly on the European mainland: informed sources report Germany's Chancellor and France's Prime Minister have been in consultation with the British Prime Minister most of the morning. Apparently the subject of the unusual consultations is the possible migration of the organism causing the devastation in London to reach Europe via international travelers.

Thesis:

Should the United States military develop a rapidly deployable standing consequence management force capable of responding to both domestic and international crises?

Background:

The scope of this research project is to examine the current United States government's implementation of a coherent strategy, supported with a viable force, to thwart the political objectives of international terrorists. Specifically, this project dissects America's ability to lessen the impact of terrorist actions through the use of Consequence Management forces.

Terrorist attacks in America's future?

The history of terrorist attacks, aimed specifically at the free world and American interest, over the past ten years is truly staggering. Consider the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin gas attack that killed 12 people and injured over 5,500, the devastation of the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia that left 19 dead and hundreds wounded, the horrific 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa that killed over 220 and wounded hundreds more, and finally the recent October 2000 small boat attack against the USS Cole in port at Yemen, killing 17 and injuring at least 35.

While these attacks have been appalling the list is far from inclusive. There is no need to focus internationally to find barbaric terrorist events; one only need look in America's backyard: the 1993 New York World Trade Center bombing that killed six and injured over a thousand and the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympic Games that witnessed the devastation of a terrorist pipe bomb that killed one and left several injured. Even more devastating was the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma that left 168 dead and hundreds more wounded.

The history of terrorism, if nothing else, proves itself to be unpredictable and devastating. But the question as to the inevitability of attacks remains unanswered. And if the attacks are inevitable, are future terrorist attacks likely to be more devastating and lethal? Should American taxpayers invest precious resources to develop the capacity to counter events that are unlikely? This is a key question as the U.S. Government (USG) is budgeted to spend \$12 billion in FY 2000 to improve her counter terrorism capabilities.¹

Imagine the long-term cost of this program if it is unwisely funded and/or improperly resourced.

The future is indeed impossible to predict; however, it is historically reasonable to expect that the threat of terrorism has not died. As the international scene has witnessed a dramatic transformation in the past ten years, so has there been equally as dramatic a change in the arsenals available to the perpetrators of terrorism. Not so many years ago it would have been ridiculous to consider that the major threat of a WMD attack would come from terrorism rather than be experienced in time of war. Yet, weapons proliferation and lack of international weapons control, especially of such powerful weapons as chemical and biological agents, have significantly altered that paradigm.

President Bill Clinton's 1999 national security strategy describes the challenges of defending the homeland in this manner; "Our potential enemies, whether nations or terrorists, may be more likely in the future to resort to attacks against vulnerable civilian targets in the United States. At the same time, easier access to sophisticated technology means that the destructive power available to rogue nations and terrorists is greater than ever." Possibly even more important the document goes on to stress; "because of our conventional military dominance, adversaries are likely to use asymmetric means, such as WMD, information operations or terrorism."²

Stated by former Secretary of Defense, William Cohen: "On Weapons of Mass Destruction, we are now seeing at least 20, 24 countries, let's call it two dozen countries who either have developed or are in the process of developing Weapons of Mass Destruction. That's a word that doesn't mean a lot, I suppose, to most people who hear it. And that's the reason why when I went on television a couple of years ago, I held up that

five-pound bag of sugar, because we were talking about Weapons of Mass Destruction. But it loses its meaning when we use that phraseology. If you take a five pound bag of sugar and you say, assuming this were filled with, let's say, anthrax instead of sugar, that with the right kind of temperatures and right kind of wind over a city the size of Washington D.C., you could wipe out almost 70 percent of the population with just five pounds. There are tons of anthrax in existence. There are tons that have been manufactured."³

The former Secretary of Defense is not alone in his Armageddon type predictions of future terrorist attacks. Former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno's testimony to Congress loudly echoes the Justice Department's similar crystal ball predictions. "Terrorists will continue, in the near term, to employ weapons and methods, such as bombings, firearms and kidnappings." She went on to state; "terrorist will not confine themselves to the use of conventional weapons. Our intelligence and investigative efforts indicate increasing interest in biological and chemical weapons."⁴

So as two top former Cabinet members stated, at a minimum the medium and the motive exist to carry out the WMD terrorist attack. But what of the likelihood of a future attack? Mr. Cohen summed up his thoughts in this manner: "... because if you think about it, in terms of terrorism coming to U.S. soil, the prospects are the you'll see multiple attacks that will occur nearly simultaneous -- much as we saw the two bombing attacks over in East Africa, almost simultaneously. And it'll be to create as much confusion and mass chaos as possible."⁵

Painting a bleak picture is not limited to those in federal government service. In the 14 April 1998 National Foundation for Infectious Diseases press release health experts disclosed; “Extremists groups worldwide are learning how to use biological agents, such as bacteria, viruses and toxins, to develop weapons and methods of delivery.” The report further expressed Doctor Michael T. Osterholm’s opinion, (Ph.D., Minnesota Department of Health, Chief Acute Disease Epidemiology Section); “It is likely that a biological terrorism disaster will occur in the United States in the near future.”⁶

As with any futuristic predictions, the picture of possible forthcoming terrorist actions is never clear. While Secretary Cohen and health experts like Doctor Osterholm are convinced that there exists a strong possibility for a major attack on U.S. soil that is not a universal outlook. In reality there exists an opinion that while the devastation wrought from a WMD terrorist attack would be unthinkable, the expertise and financial resources to carry out such an attack make the prospects so low as to not require the current amount of federal, state, and local governmental attention.

In a U.S. General Accounting Office report on combating terrorism, the dissenting and often fractured view of the improbability and lackluster plausibility of a terrorist WMD attack was clearly endorsed.⁷ The report cited several “intelligence assessments” as concluding; “terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological weapons than conventional explosives”. This is an understandable conclusion when intelligence agencies often provide conflicting assessments of terrorist’s WMD capabilities. For instance, “in 1996, the CIA Director testified that chemical and biological weapons can be produced with relative ease in simple laboratories”. In 1997 the CIA Director went on to say, “delivery and dispersal techniques also are effective and relatively easy to

develop”. However, the report also quoted the 1998 Deputy Commander of the Army’s Medical Research and Material Command, “an effective mass casualty producing attack on our citizens would require either a fairly large, very technically competent, well-funded terrorist program or state sponsorship”. Finally, the report went on to quote the FBI position, “the threat of terrorists’ use of chemical and biological weapons is low”. While the report does not rule out the possibility, it significantly downplays the probability.

Based on recent events the “unlikely to happen” view is a puzzling one. The well-known exploits of the Aum Shinrikyo cult, infamous for the 1995 sarin attack on Tokyo, are generally limited to their singular infamous event that made world headline news. A lesser-known, potentially devastating attack was frustrated just one year after the subway disaster. In 1996, the Tokyo police recovered from the cult, approximately one ounce of the highly toxic nerve agent VX, an amount sufficient to kill over 15,000.⁸ So while the global community believed the madness of the cult had been forever eliminated, the fact remained that the organization was still in the process of developing the means to obtain their original hateful goals.

There are those that champion the concept that the best method to reduce and/or eliminate the threats, of this nature, are to carefully monitor and control such well financed groups as the Aum Shinrikyo. However, an attack producing mass casualties does not necessarily require the financial and organizational backing of a cult the size of the before mentioned Japanese extremist group. As reported in a 1997 National Governors Association report; “In December 1995, Army veteran and “survivalist” Thomas Lewis Lavy was arrested on an Arkansas farm where thirty federal agents, along

with US Army biological warfare experts, retrieved 130 grams of ricin-enough to kill 30,000 people. Ricin, a derivative of the castor bean, is one of the most dangerous known toxins.”

While called the “poor man’s WMD”, chemical and biological weapons are not the only major issues of concern; the threat of nuclear terrorism is far from over. Senator Richard Lugar stated during testimony, “We have found that the former Soviet storage facilities are unsafe and insecure. We have learned that there are people and organizations in the world who are attempting to acquire these weapons and materials for terrorist purposes.”⁹ In fact one such group attempting to obtain the materials was the Aum Shinrikyo cult. Moreover, the narrow view that the fissile material needs to be weaponized, in order to be of concern, is preposterous. If a large quantity of fissile material were dispersed, over a large area, by the detonation of a substantial conventional explosive, the cleanup effort would be unprecedented. The affected area may be uninhabitable for years.

Possibly the most powerful pessimistic statements concerning the probability of a future WMD terrorist attack were delivered by Mr. Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator. “Well, there’s a new kind of threat. It’s not missiles flying over the Poles. The new kind of threat is terrorists sneaking into our country, living in our country for a while and acquiring weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological or even nuclear...” When asked if he could quantify the likelihood of an attack of that magnitude, the response was disheartening; “President Clinton said there was a 100 percent chance. He said that within the next ten years, there was a 100 percent chance of a chemical or biological weapon attack in our country.”¹⁰

It would seem that the means to carry out a WMD attack, anywhere in the world, are definitely available. It would also seem that there is a credible terrorist threat and that the perpetrators are likely to attack the United States. If these facts are valid, is it not the responsibility of the United States government to protect and defend its citizenry against these likely threats? Are the consequences of being unprepared for a WMD terrorist attack acceptable? Just to reiterate the Secretary of Defense's point, the reason we need to be prepared for such attacks is that the devastation wrought is nearly unthinkable.

Nature of the Attackers

The endless array of available targets and twisted motives for terrorist attacks are incessant. Combine the lucrative target availability with an unquenchable desire to impose modifications ranging from political reform, through populace ideological transformation, to the utopian attainment of heaven by martyrdom: The result is deadly.

This wide range of motivation makes for a difficult dissection and classification of those responsible for such unthinkable acts. The classification of terrorists is important as it enables further study into the possible threat. If the threat can be studied it can eventually be countered. The study further enables the identification of not only the possible, but the probable, the likely, and the worst case situation. This type of approach affords the best solution for the application of resources to counter the most significant threat.

The above outlined process has long been a part of American counter-terrorism efforts. While an in-depth discussion of the myriad groups and types of groups is not critical to this project, the classification of two basic groups is. The first groups are those that function and execute their dubious agendas independent, or nearly so, of state sponsorship. The second groups are those that are state-sponsored and are supported to help achieve the political, economic, military, and/or ideological goals of the sponsoring state.

Understanding the basic differences between these two types of terrorist organizations is critical. Perhaps most important, understanding the fact that state-sponsored terrorism presents enormous challenges to the American government is

paramount. Why is the central truth about state-sponsored terrorism so important? The fact is that, while possibly less probable, state-sponsored attacks are more likely to be significantly better financed, more strategically minded, broader in scope, and better orchestrated.

Despite the devastation of the terrorist attacks of the past ten years they could all be categorized as attacks from individual groups and not from state-sponsored organizations seeking the attainment of state goals. Ponder how much more devastating the attack on the New York Trade Center could have been had it been better planned and executed. Moreover, consider that attack had it been conducted congruently or in short order sequentially with another major attack.

There is no doubt that the human suffering caused by the Trade Towers bombing was horrific; however, the situation could have been far worse. A critical, yet little known, fact about the New York bombing remains widely uncirculated and anonymous to this day. The terrorist packed large quantities of cyanide poison with the weapon.¹¹ The well-devised and poorly executed plan was to cause panic from the blast, create an environment of mass exodus from the facility, and ensure the panicked throngs were slain by the poison gas. Only the unanticipated power of the device destroying the cyanide controlled the number of casualties to those who died, and were injured, from the blast and/or the ensuing infrastructure collapse.

Now judge if the radical Islamic organization, responsible for the Trade Towers bombing, had been better equipped, financed, and educated. The results could have been catastrophic; over 50 thousand people were present inside the buildings at the time of the explosion. Moreover, hundreds of local government employees responded to the

situation to control the chaos. Imagine the scene if the poison gas filled the building, or the commotion if the first police officers and firemen fell victim to an area wrought with cyanide.



While the terrorist attacks of the past decade have been devastating, they have not been debilitating nor threatening to the U.S. infrastructure, economy, or America's international stature. However, a well-orchestrated state-sponsored attack could indeed threaten our vital national interests. A state-sponsored biological or chemical attack against the city of London followed by a similar attack in Denver could literally threaten global stability. Thus, the terrorist threat that poses the gravest danger to the United States, and her vital national interests, is one from a hostile nation.

This form of asymmetric warfare may very well be the wave of the future. World leaders have not missed the opportunity to scrutinize America's most recent way of war. Lessons on U.S. military dominance have been lost on few, if any potential enemies. It might be difficult to find even one state so bold as to face the U.S. military on her own terms. If the goals of a nation require it to limit U.S. influence, lessen international prestige, or attempt to completely overpower America, that nation will, more than likely, be forced to use means other than that of an army on army clash with the U.S.

Several studies have endorsed the probability of the increasing threat of asymmetric targeting against America. Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and

International Studies (CSIS) describes the issue as follows; “Seen over a 25 year period, however, the probability of some sophisticated form of major asymmetric attack is high, not only on [the] US, but our allies.” He went on to say, “Multiple and sequential attacks [are] more likely, as are mixes of methods of attack. [The] availability of sophisticated biological and nuclear weapons [are] more likely”. And finally, “ [The United States] Really have not conducted systematic threat evaluation of who can really use different kinds of [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear] CBRN weapons and methods of attack”¹².

For the sake of space, consider just the possibilities of a biological attack on Washington D.C. (Keep in mind it’s important to understand that a chemical, radiological, and/or nuclear attack could be equally as plausible and effective.) If, through the use of several biological weapons released simultaneously, commonly referred to as “biological cocktails”, the attackers could indeed achieve a 70 percent mortality rate would they not cause an unprecedented mass panic? As previously described, biological weapons are not only available but are not extremely difficult to manufacture. The means to deliver them are likewise readily available. It may be absolutely impossible to attribute the attack to the aggressor. If a nation’s goal is to weaken the U.S. leadership or economy there is not necessarily any need to claim responsibility for achieving the desired end-state. The ability to positively confirm responsibility would after all bring an unprecedented reaction and retaliation.

To many, the solution to prevent such state-sponsored attacks is clear and simple. The United States should bring to bear all of its resources, both political and military, against any such state that would support terrorist actions against American interests.

Unfortunately, the ability to unequivocally discern a direct tie between the perpetrators of the terrorist actions and the state-sponsor may be impossible. Remember, after years of investigation is there now a complete accounting of who and what foreign governments were involved in the Pan-American Airlines Lockerbie bombing? Exactly who, and with whose sponsorship, was the Kohabar Towers bombings carried out?

America's perceived advantage in using military intervention against a state sponsoring terrorism is likely a toothless deterrent.

Who Would Attack America?

America as a whole, and more specifically senior American leaders, struggle to grasp the ramifications of the new world order. No longer does a bipolar environment dominate the globe; the U.S. has emerged as the single prevailing world power. And while the unprecedented rapid change in the situation has left virtually every nation in the position of being strategically unprepared, America alone remains in the leadership role.

While welcome, this major shift in the global landscape, resulting in the U.S.'s hierarchical dominance, has left gaping holes in her doctrinal philosophies. Gone are the days of keeping the Soviet Bear in the zoo. Today's challenges range from containing the human atrocities in Bosnia, to the technical disasters of Chernobyl, through the natural disasters of the flooding in East Africa. And while these world events are not new, America's expected every event intervention is.

Why is it then that the United States should consider state sponsored terrorism a critical issue? After all, if America is truly the dominant world leader, why should she expect to be attacked by another government? Rogue individuals whose ideological paradigms drive them to madness are surely impossible to control. But would it not be suicidal for a smaller, less powerful nation to attack or sponsor an attack on the U.S.?

History might prove a valuable ally in determining the likelihood of a lesser nation's willingness to engage in open, much less veiled, confrontation with America through the use of terrorism. As the prosperity and growth in America's affluence continue, the chasm between our Nation and the rest of the world will widen. Will the disparity of wealth generate such ill will amongst poor nations as to vilify the U.S.? Will nations sit

idly by following America's success in Iraq and the Balkans? Is it not more reasonable to assume less powerful nations may begin to prepare themselves against an America that will impose her will on others?

There are countless historical precedents of less powerful smaller nations engaging in open warfare against a militarily superior country. One need only review the past hundred years to find what might have been considered suicidal adventures of their day. And yet, the leadership in the less dominant nations was willing to gamble the very existence of their societies.

What must have it been like to be with the Japanese leadership when they determined to openly attack the dominate Russian Navy in 1904? Did the 1941 Japanese military leadership truly judge they had the capacity, capability, and resources to defeat America? Is it remotely possible that in 1950 the North Korean government truly believed the United Nations would stand passively by following the invasion of the South? Can anyone understand the 1979 Afghanistan leadership's decision for armed rebellion, leading to the invasion, against the former Soviet Union?

Even with a limited look at the past hundred years, it is clearly obvious that if a disadvantaged nation believes it is within its strategic national priorities, open combatant conflict is most certainly an option. Considering the global environment of the 21st century, to what greater degree are nations apt to use the shroud of terrorism to meet their strategic objectives? What better way to hamper, restrict, and minimize your enemy's capabilities than by the stealth of terrorism? Imagine the capability to meet your national priorities, by reducing your enemy's potential, with little or no chance of retribution.

It can be strongly argued that any attack, open or veiled, would lead to the eventual downfall of the aggressor. This contention has led many to propose the U.S. should employ a wait and see doctrine. When and if a major terrorist attack occurs, then, and only then should we respond. However, when considering the cost to America to recover from a major WMD attack the "suicidal endeavor, thus not likely" proponent's argument fails. If we are caught off guard and/or unprepared, the chaos that would most assuredly ensue from a successful attack could literally change the freedoms and thus the way of life in the U.S. forever. Moreover, the "unlikely to happen from a State" argument is similarly weakened by the concept of a country, such as Yugoslavia, opposed to U.S. policy that believes it has no chance for survival without desperate measures. Why not inflict pain on America if she's going to use her military might to kill your citizenry and impose her unwelcome will on you?

If a terrorist WMD attack takes place on U.S. soil just how devastating can the attack be? After all, even if we are strategically unprepared how much damage can a single event cause? This is the exact mentality of the Nation prior to the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. Has anyone ever truly captured the cost of the Japanese surprise attack? Is it even remotely possible to quantify the devastation following American entry into the Pacific War of the 1940's?

Many believe that the idea of a modern-day Pearl Harbor is absurd. With the advent of technologically sophisticated intelligence systems, it is unreasonable to contemplate that America would again fall victim to such a shocking attack. Yet there are those who believe the maturation and availability of WMD to terrorists has renewed our strategic vulnerability. One such individual, the man most often credited with eradicating

smallpox, Dr. Donald Henderson, clearly states a biological attack on America would be a modern-day equivalent to our Pearl Harbor disaster.¹³

Reality of the Possible

Just how devastating would a well-coordinated international and domestic WMD terrorist attack against the United States and her vital national interests be? Is it possible that a “center of gravity” attack could nearly collapse the global economy, as we know it today? For the scenario to be realistic, there must be a plausible enemy with the means and the motive to carry out an unconscionable lawless act. Contemplate Saudi Arabia's dissident, Osama Bin Laden, a dynamic, war- hardened, radical fundamentalist who is extremely wealthy, astonishingly popular, and hell-bent on completely removing American influence in the Middle East.

Following the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, it was reported that Bin Laden, accused in the 1998 U.S. Africa Embassies bombings, was published in Pakistan's largest circulation Urdu-language newspaper, The Jang, meaning War stating. "I am not afraid of the American threats against me," he said in his first statement since December 1998. "As long as I am alive there will be no rest for the enemies of Islam. I will continue my mission against them."¹⁴

For argument's sake, let's propose Bin Laden executed a worldwide three-prong offensive operation. The first known attack begins Tuesday evening in the Tokyo financial district. An extremely large conventional explosive detonates as the majority of financiers are leaving work. The blast is followed by the release of a highly concentrated cyanide gas. Simultaneously, as commuters pack London's mass transit system, bound for work, thousands fall victim to the multi-station deadly sarin gas release. Finally, the early hours of Tuesday morning fall witness to what are the embryonic stages of a mass

throng of New York City citizens seeking medical attention for their unbeknownst, days old, anthrax infections. While this scenario would by no stretch of the imagination be easy to execute, the terrifying reality is its plausibility.

In the name of realism, let's draw some parallels with recent international terrorist attacks to the proposed scenario. The Tokyo attack described is a copycat of the 1993 N.Y. Trade Towers bombing; likewise, London's attack is a mirror of the 1995 Tokyo subway operation, and finally the New York City anthrax attack parallels Secretary of Defense Cohen's "five pound bag" anthrax attack where he described the major U.S. city population loss at 70 percent.

Who's to say the terrorists will limit themselves to one biological weapon for an attack. If terror and death is the road to achieving political objectives why not increase the potential for success? WMD discussions often center on the use of "a" biological weapon, to increase lethality, why not disburse a mixed cocktail weapon? If you can kill 70 percent of the population of Washington D.C. with five pounds of anthrax, how much better are your chances using three separate biological agents?

Ponder the consequences of only one of these major catastrophes in an event of this magnitude, and then open the aperture to the possibility if the terrorists were successful with all three. The initial October 2000 Israeli/Palestinian violence drove the U.S. stock market down over 1000 points to an eight month low. What would the worldwide financial markets situation be following the closure of Tokyo, London, and N.Y.?

This scenario may not be the worst possible case. What are the implications for America of a large-scale chemical, biological, or nuclear attack against a strategic ally? Would America not be compelled to respond? Would the provided assistance then

emasculate the U.S. government's ability to respond to a domestic crisis? Consider a biological attack against London, Tokyo, or Frankfurt. Surely the United States would be compelled to provide any and all resources requested and available. Yet, imagine the consequences of a near sequential well-organized attack. Imagine America providing assistance to a strategic foreign ally only to find herself days or weeks later in a similar dire position.

The Road to Apparent Unpreparedness

The unfortunate reality of the world today is that the terrorism threat is real and grows in deadly historical footnotes every year. However, it is interesting to note that only in the past ten or so years has the United States government begun to seriously address the fundamental challenges associated with modern terrorist actions. How is it that a nation as powerful and resourceful as America could find herself staring at a gaping hole in her strategic philosophy?

Simply put, the Nation spent fifty years completely occupied with the Cold War. America's political and military interests were focused on the problems associated with the conflicting, often hostile, bi-polar environment. This global milieu had several highly undesirable conditions, not the least of which was the number of nuclear warheads staring down at the two major participants. On the other hand the development of a national strategic vision, during the bi-polar era, was relatively easy. The United States experience in the first two world wars lent itself nicely to the development of a strategy to counter a major economically sound militarily powerful foe.

Not only was the atmosphere conducive to the development of a near myopic strategy, the environment controlled the necessity for broader strategic thinking. With all the problems associated with the totalitarian Soviet regime, the system was not only able to keep tight controls on the countries' WMD assets and technologies, it was able to control its citizens and influence those nations allied to the point that global terrorism was a non-strategic international issue.

While the world was not immune from terrorist attacks during this era, the loss of several hundred lives from a hijacking seemed far less strategically important than the loss of millions from nuclear war. Never, during the Cold War, was there any reasonable credence given to the possibility of a nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorist attack. And while the collapse of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) had an enormous impact on the global situation, it is not the only factor affecting our strategic void. The emergence of America's phenomenally demonstrated military dominance over the past 20 years has raised global concerns from both friends and foes alike.

The global military dominance displayed by America's crushing defeat of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War encouraged U.S. enemies to reassess their abilities to challenge her directly. Following the sage advice of the Chinese military theorist, Sun Tzu, America's enemies have looked increasingly towards asymmetric warfare as a means and method to bridge the gap of traditional U.S. military dominance.¹⁵

The probability of asymmetric warfare tactics being employed against America in the future is significant. So much so, and of such concern, that senior civilian Department of Defense (DOD) leadership is intently focused on the issue. Former Secretary of Defense Cohen recently invited the author, Clayton Christiansen, to express his views in his 1997 book "The Inventor's Dilemma ", to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the words of Secretary Cohen, Mr. Christiansen's point can be summed up this way, "You take some of the major companies in this country of ours who are doing everything right. They had top personnel. They had great leadership. They had great flow of revenue. They were investing in research and development. They were trying to anticipate what their customers wanted, and they failed. And he talked about the need to

anticipate how new technology or how disruptive technology can come in, not at the top end but at the low end of the marketplace."

While the importance of this issue may be lost on many, it has not been lost on the former Secretary of Defense. He summed up his concerns presented in Christiansen's book by stating the following: "...and I think that was very instructive for all the military leadership, because we have to think, forward look into the future and say, who is it who's going to challenge us directly? Should we be looking for some disruptive technology's, looking for somebody to come in at the low end of things to take the United States on?"¹⁶

Our historical view toward state on state, army on army warfare served us so well during the Cold War we crushed the Soviet Empire. However, now we must not only maintain the ability to fight and win a future conventional large scale conflict, we must be prepared to effectively deal with a powerful growing asymmetric threat. Future U.S. enemies will use asymmetric means and strike at the American heartland.

Unless the government begins a costly concerted effort to correct past shortfalls, America will continue to drift without vector and grow more and more vulnerable to a catastrophic crisis. WMD terrorist situations fall into an area of strategic voids and are handled in an ad hoc fashion. The United States has lackadaisically allowed a significant amount of time to pass without a concerted effort toward strategic doctrinal development, especially in the consequence management arena. The result is our glaring inability to deal with the aftermaths of international terrorism situations with a strategic vision and a capable, trained, and well equipped force.

The Road to Recovery

The likelihood of future terrorist attacks against the United States looms not in the fantasies of hawkish individuals seeking increased budgetary outlays, but in the realities of the personalities of such unstable men as Osama bin Laden. Due largely to the recent history of violent terrorist attacks against the United States, and the potential catastrophic consequences of a successful WMD terrorist event, the federal government, specifically the last three Presidents and the Congress have recognized the need to thwart and/or minimize the likelihood, impact, and recurrence of these attacks.

As early as 1986, President Reagan's National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 207)¹⁷ laid the groundwork for developing and implementing a nationally organized program to deal with the growing threat of international terrorism. This was a critical first step in the federal government's attempt to develop and implement a strategy to deal with the perpetrators of terror. While an important cornerstone, the policy left several emerging issues, such as consequence management, completely overlooked. This is not surprising. After all, not until the 1986 Goldwater-Nicholas Act was anyone in the government even required to produce a stated strategy to achieve national priorities and articulate national interest. Goldwater-Nicholas required the President to produce an annual National Security Strategy (NSS) and for the Defense Department to produce a complementary National Military Strategy (NMS).¹⁸

Once forced to actually develop and produce a set of documents that quantified and qualified American's interest, terms such as "national interest, vital national interest, and enduring national interest" began to emerge. Questions arose as to what America's long-

term priorities are and what the issues the nation deals with today are that may be important but are in reality transitory concerns. This process began to more tightly focus attention on the need to prioritize the Nation's internal concerns, global engagement strategy, and resource allocation. As the method has matured, the NSS has had a major impact on the U.S. and her development of doctrine to achieve her stated goals. Unfortunately, the stated process is only 14 years old; not nearly enough time to fully appreciate the dynamics, develop a strategy, and implement a policy to effectively operate in a rapidly changing world.

The sad fact is the corollary of an embryonic process is that "we don't know what we don't know." Many times issues affecting the Nation may simply not be completely addressed. For instance, not until the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal building was the USG very concerned with internal terrorism. Thus, the NSS documents prior to 1995 show little or no interest in the subject of domestically grown and executed terrorism. The best minds in the federal government arduously labor over the NSS and yet the final product still fails to completely capture our country's stated position on many issues. This reality has produced an undesirable side effect; individuals and states too often literally interpret the document and do not necessarily interpret the intent.

Despite the history of the NSS, America still has a major growing challenge from international terrorism. After more than a decade of a concentrated anti/counter terrorism policy, the threats obtainment and use of WMD weapons seems inevitable. From President Reagan's original 1987 NSS through Bill Clinton's 1999 NSS document every version has highlighted the need to control the effects of international terrorism. Yet, we seem dauntingly set on a course for a disaster. We, as a nation, continue to develop and

refine our terrorism policies and yet are we missing something? Is there an important factor we've overlooked?

If we can't prevent the deadly demoralizing attacks, such as the one on the U.S.S. Cole, what will the situation be when the chemical or biological weapon detonates affecting our vital national interest? Are we to be left to simply pick up the pieces? Are we developing a proactive philosophy to ensure those that would attack us are aware of their probable failure? Are we building a force capable of mitigating the effects of an attack we were unable to prevent? Will we be able to respond to an international attack that requires our participation?

Current Direction

The 1999 National Security Strategy (NSS): "A National Security Strategy for a New Century", clearly states the Nation's strategic interests include the prevention of terrorist acts against the United States and our allies. Specifically in plain text, the document articulates; "because terrorist organizations may not be deterred by traditional means, we must ensure a robust capability to accurately attribute the source of attacks against the United States or its citizens, and respond effectively and decisively to protect our national interest."

While the ability to respond "effectively and decisively" is critical to the successful execution of the strategy, the value of deterrence must not be underestimated. In fact, the document goes on to state "Deterrence in crisis generally involves signaling the United States' commitment to a particular country or interest by enhancing our war fighting capability in the theater. We may also choose to make additional statements to communicate the cost of aggression or coercion to an adversary, and in some cases may choose to employ U.S. forces to underline the message and her further adventurism."

The National Military Strategy (NMS) articulates the necessity for U.S. military forces to be prepared to respond to terrorist attacks. Without belaboring the issue, the NMS is developed as a singularly focused version of the NSS. Specifically, the NMS highlights the areas from the NSS that the DOD will be involved in and then describes how, in broad terms, the overall federal governments plan(s) will be implemented and executed within the military. Thus, every NMS has echoed the critical necessity to

overcome the growing threats of terrorism with a robust program of resource allocation, personnel training, and proactive engagement across the spectrum of military operations.

The frequency and lethality with which terrorist events occur continues to grow. To say the federal government is engaged in the study of the burgeoning terrorist threat is an understatement. In fact, virtually every level of our government and the majority of national security related think tanks have proposed methods and means to control the problem. Specifically, these efforts have been translated into guidance and direction at every level. Yet, regardless of the persuasive articulation of the requirements to deal with a real threat to the nation's security, in such documents as the NSS and NMS, the development and implementation of an interagency structure capable of quickly dealing with a broad spectrum of international terrorist events has been extremely slow. The increasing likelihood of future attacks, and the apparent ineffectual results of our growing counters, has driven the development and implementation of countless policies. At the top of these directing principles is the guidance that has been articulated through three sets of regulations developed and fielded from the White House known as Presidential Decision Directives (PDD).

PDD 39: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, 21 June 1995. As described in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Federal Response Plan. "PDD 39 directs a number of measures to reduce the Nation's vulnerability to terrorism, to deter and respond to terrorist acts, and to strengthen capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons including Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). PDD 39 discusses crisis management and consequence management."¹⁹

PDD 56: Managing Complex Contingency Operations, May 1997. As described in the White Paper distributed throughout the federal government. "The need for complex contingency operations is likely to recur in future years, demanding varying degrees of U.S. involvement. The PDD calls for all U.S. government agencies to institutionalize what we have learned from past experiences and to continue the process of improving the planning and management of complex contingency operations. The PDD is designed to ensure that the lessons learned -- including proven planning processes and implementation mechanics -- will be incorporated into the interagency process on a regular basis."²⁰

PDD 62: Combating Terrorism, May 1998. "This Directive creates a new and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat of the next century. It reinforces the mission of the many U.S. agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism; it also codifies and clarifies their activities in the wide range of U.S. counter-terrorism programs, from apprehension and prosecution of terrorist to increasing transportation security, enhancing response capabilities and protecting the computer based systems that lie at the heart of America's economy. To achieve this new level of integration in the fight against terror, PDD-62 establishes the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator will oversee the broad variety of relevant policies and programs including areas such as counter-terrorism, protection of critical infrastructure, preparedness and consequence management for weapons of mass destruction."²¹

Not only is the United States' position on terrorism defined in strategic terms through the use of the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the

PDD's, several laws have been written specifically targeting terrorism. Further, several of these laws take direct aim at filling the void between our strategic policy and tactical employment. One such keystone law is the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act.²²

While this law does not specifically address international terrorism, several of its key elements were critical in identifying current shortfalls in America's ability to respond domestically to attacks involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. For instance, Section (19) states the U.S. lacks adequate planning and countermeasures to address the threat of nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical terrorism. Moreover, in plain language the Act emphatically addresses America's shortfalls in domestic consequence management.²³

Our inability to cope with homeland catastrophes has been the subject of much literature in the past several years. This growing focus and concern has brought such heightened awareness that what was just recently being written about only in strategic studies has made a dramatic transition into new public laws. In fact, Public Law 104 -- 201, Title XIV, expresses not only the inability of local emergency response personnel to deal with a WMD event, it spells out deficiencies in preparedness and coordination. It should be plainly obvious that if America is unable to adequately respond to a domestic terrorist WMD event, our international response capability must be far worse.

The good news is there is a consensus among virtually every level and organization in the federal government that the critical problems associated with a terrorist WMD attack must be addressed. Unfortunately, without any strategic vision everyone from Congress to and through the major federal departments and agencies are, in their own

stove-piped paradigms, chaotically rushing to fill the strategic, operational, and tactical voids.

The environment continues to grow cloudy with new, well-intentioned, laws. For instance, the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act included specific language requiring the Defense Department to, over a five-year period, review and prepare its "Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction". Scarcely one year later the 1998 Department of Justice Appropriations Act became "the baseline strategy for U.S. counterterrorism efforts". Attorney General Reno testified, "the plan addresses critical technologies for targeted research and development, preventing and deterring terrorism, integrating crisis and consequence management."²⁴ Thus, within a one-year cycle the federal government produced two multiyear law based separate and competing counterterrorism policies.

There remains little in the way of a national level strategy to focus on the challenges the U.S. faces from international WMD terrorism. As the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) puts it, "The United States is spending billions of dollars annually to combat terrorism without assurance that federal funds are focused on the right programs or in the right amounts." More strongly worded, "[There is] unnecessary program duplication, overlap, and gaps; [There is no assurance of] correctly sizing individual agencies' levels of effort, [And finally] there are different sets of views and apparent lack of consensus on the threat of terrorism—particularly weapons of mass destruction."²⁵

The lack of an overarching national level strategy for combating domestic and international terrorism is fostering the development of several separate and competing

programs. This is no small issue as the results are voids, not only in strategic concept but, more importantly in an operational command configuration and a tactical force structure necessary to combat the threat. For instance, based on PDD 39, domestic consequence management is a responsibility of FEMA and international consequence management is the responsibility of the State Department. The development of such a process should on the surface make perfect sense. FEMA is by no means resourced to nor does it possess the expertise to deal with foreign nationals during a foreign crisis. Likewise the DOS is not trained nor equipped to deal with domestic disasters be they natural or manmade. However, while well intentioned this delineation of responsibilities has fostered an environment of competing philosophies, resource allocations, and timeline implementations. Simply put, the programs currently compete and should complement not vie with one another.

Not only is there competitiveness amongst federal government organizations, there is resource competition within the differing arms of a process that should have the same goals; the prevention and mitigation of a successful attack. Yet, due to the lack of an overarching policy, there are several strategic gaps in our approach to combating WMD terrorism. One of the major shortfalls, in the lack of a national policy, has been the competitive nature of the two major areas of concern put forth in PDD-39; crisis and consequence management. The subordination of the consequence management process to that of crisis management has rendered it little more than a well-devised cleanup plan in the aftermath of an attack.

While never envisioned as setting competing priorities, PDD-39 introduction without much clarification of crisis management and consequence management produced some

unexpected and undesirable results. Due in part to the revolutionary new concept, due in part to the void in expertise, and due in part to the enormous challenge of denying an enemy's intended objectives, the concept of consequence management has become an after thought and generally sequential process to that of crisis management. In fact in order to be successful, consequence management absolutely must be a linear process that operates concurrently with crisis management.

Although unintended, the process of subordination of consequence management to crisis management continues. The former United States Atlantic Command's (USACOM) instruction to stand up the new Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS) addresses the relationship of crisis and consequence management in this manor; "PDD 39 conceptually separates response to a WMD incident into two phases – [crisis management] CrM, during which a credible terrorist threat to use a WMD device exist, and [consequence management] CoM that begins after an actual WMD release or detonation."²⁶ This type of thought process further solidifies an atmosphere where consequence management will never emerge as a deterrent; it will only function as a well-organized clean-up effort.

Keep in mind the JTF-CS has the responsibility to act as the primary source for developing emerging DOD consequence management doctrine. If the organization maintains its mantra, as delineated in its implementation instruction, joint doctrine will emerge and be institutionalized functionally subordinating consequence management to purely a secondary role.

Not only is there a shortfall in the operationalized timeline from crisis management to consequence management, so also there is a problem in the fielding of the forces to tackle the consequence management problem. In theory the doctrinal development,

conceptual force design, and field implementation of two separate and distinct entities to handle domestic and international terrorism may be attractive. After all, the challenges facing the federal government from a biological attack on a major U.S. population center would seem far different than those opposed from a similar attack against an ally's major population center. Unfortunately, in practical terms not only would the cost of two separate forces be untenable, but the very nature and makeup of such organizations would draw on the same extremely Low Density High Demand (LDHD) assets.

Yet, the National Security Strategy would tend to support such a two-tiered approach. In the "Domestic Preparedness against Weapons of Mass Destruction" area the NSS states, "The federal government will respond rapidly and decisively to any terrorist incident in the United States involving WMD." Moreover, the section is even more explicit supporting domestic federal, state, and local agencies in "crisis response and managing the consequences of a WMD incident."

Thus, as with PDD 39, the current NSS likewise produces some debilitating unintended outcomes affecting the United States' approach to terrorism. Arguably, the development of a robust capability to deal with a major terrorist attack on U.S. soil has a direct correlation to our ability to respond internationally. However, it seems odd to develop a standing Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS) to handle domestic WMD problems and leave an international incident in the laps of the regional Commander and Chief(s) (CINCs).

Consider the NSS statements on national security emergency preparedness: "But if an emergency does occur, we must be prepared to respond effectively at home and abroad to protect the lives and property, mobilize the personnel, resources and

capabilities and necessary to effectively handle the emergency, and ensure the survival of our institutions and infrastructures." So, we must be able to respond effectively "abroad" and yet we concentrate the vast majority of assets and resources towards a counter attack or towards reducing the effects of a domestic WMD event.

The two major flaws in that philosophy are first; the pundits that say the country need not respond to an international WMD occurrence. Simply put that's a flawed outlook, the U.S. will respond if called upon by a strategic ally. Moreover, there are in fact multiple reasons we may not be obligated to assist an ally but, more importantly, be required to minimize the damage to our overseas interest, not to mention our obligation to protect American personnel living and/or stationed abroad. Is there any doubt the federal government would respond with all of our capabilities if a biological weapon were released on the 25,000-combined military/civilian U.S. personnel population of Kadena Air Base Japan? Secondly, to assume the terrorists will use a single point strike is ludicrous. What better way to affect the Nation than by planning an attack that requires the U.S. to move her LDHD assets to an overseas location, in response to a must respond attack, and to then strike with a more vicious attack on the U.S. mainland?

So, where do we stand today? Are we capable of preventing and when not possible responding to the coming devastation? What's the status of our force? Have the challenges of a possible overseas attack followed by an attack within the U.S. been resolved? Are we building a force that is capable of deterring terrorist actions? A look at the current force structure is very revealing.

The Current Consequence Management Force Structure

The national command and control organization and interagency makeup designed to overcome the threat and, if necessary, mitigate the aftermath of any terrorist event remains relatively stable regardless of the location of the attack. The lead for all responses to a terrorist event is the President; the National Security Council (NSC) supports him. As chartered in the National Security Act of 1947, “the function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”²⁷

Supporting the NSC is a group known as the “Principles Committee”, this organization is derived from the President’s cabinet, and, at a minimum, is staffed by cabinet-level representatives. Supporting the Principles Committee is the “Deputies Committee”; senior sub-cabinet members staff this component. Their responsibilities include an in-depth knowledge of the interagency operating capabilities and procedures. The Deputies Committee is charged with identifying conflicting interagency policies and forwarding suggested solutions to the Principles Committee for resolution.

Finally, the Deputies Committee is supported by the “Interagency Working Groups (IWG)”; these groups are comprised of various assistant and deputy-assistant secretary level teams or individuals. These groups are varied in their makeup and design, some are permanent members of the IWG and some are derived in an ad hoc fashion to meet a unique, non-recurring, challenge. These groups, with their singular expertise, meet to

assess and derive policy for crisis situations. Moreover, the groups develop practical applications for time critical interagency decision-making, possible military force application situations, and delineation of responsibilities and duties to the various governmental agencies within the interagency.

By definition the fact that the above outlined groups deal with the results of a wide range of enemy methods and/or application of force techniques prevents the organization from maintaining a static composition. For instance, the makeup of the IWG in a crisis involving a large conventional weapon is likely to be different from that if the weapon was a chemical or biological agent. For that reason it becomes very difficult to complete an inclusive list of departments and/or agencies that would participate in any given terrorist event. However, it is possible to narrow the potential list to those that have historically been involved.

The Agency for International Development (AID): USAID is an independent federal government agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. The agency works in six principal areas crucial to achieving both sustainable development and advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives: Economic growth and agricultural development, Population, health and nutrition, Environment, Democracy and governance, Education and Training, and Humanitarian assistance.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): The Agency's responsibilities include the collecting, analyzing, and disseminating of intelligence of concern to national security. It conducts counter intelligence abroad and coordinates with the FBI on domestic counter intelligence. The CIA has no domestic security function and is strictly prohibited from law enforcement and subpoena actions.

Department of Defense (DOD): For the sake of simplicity the DOD may be broken down into four basic organizations within an organization. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), which is the principal staff agency for policy development, resource management, and program evaluation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), comprised of the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and the four service chiefs. The military Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. And finally the unified combatant commands are comprised of the five regional geographic areas. These areas are the responsibility of the regional CINCs and their apportioned forces. The Department's capabilities include a wide range of traditional military missions to include the full spectrum of combat operations. In addition, the DOD has a robust non-traditional military capability to support humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, peace making, logistics support, and medical assistance to name a few.

The Department of Energy (DOE): In addition to its peacetime responsibilities the DOE, through its Emergency Response Program, provides expertise on all forms of nuclear situations from accidents such as Three Mile Island to the possible intentional use of a nuclear weapon or the spread of radiological material by terrorist. In addition the agency has a crisis response capability to provide radiological assessment, monitoring, and reaction to an incident as well as facilities to handle victims of radiation.

The Department of Justice (DOJ): Designated as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for crisis management within the U.S., the primary role of the DOJ, in support of the interagency process, is through its subordinate agencies and organizations. The Department normally executes its law enforcement, intelligence, and counter-intelligence through the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

United States Marshals Service (USMS), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the United States National Central Bureau (USNCB). The agencies monitor the activities of known terrorist organizations in an attempt to prevent their successful execution of an attack. In addition, to ensure punishment and deter future events, these agencies vigorously investigate, apprehend, and prosecute perpetrators of terrorist acts.

The Department of State (DOS): Designated as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for both crisis and consequence management overseas; the primary role of the DOS, in support of the interagency process, is to provide requested assistance to a Host Nation (HN) as articulated through the U.S. Ambassador in coordination with the regional CINC. To accomplish this task in the field the State Department has formed the "Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST), which is prepared to be deployed on short notice to the scene of an incident. FEST teams are tailored to the nature of the event and include personnel from the State Department, Defense Department, FBI, and other agencies as appropriate."²⁸

The Department of Transportation (DOT): The department supports the interagency through an extensive planning and logistical apparatus designed to enhance law enforcement, force protection, combat operations, deterrence, crisis response, disaster assistance, and humanitarian relief efforts. The execution of these core missions is accomplished through DOT controlled organizations such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the Federal Highway Administration (FHA), and the Federal Railway Administration (FRA).

The Department of Treasury (TREAS): The Department of the Treasury supports a wide range of interagency operations through its eclectic mix of organizations. The

extensive variety of support from such organizations as the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) enable the TREAS to provide law enforcement, public safety, and suppression and interdiction of illegal trafficking to name a few.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): The Lead Federal Agency for domestic consequence management. FEMA is responsible for all domestic planning, mitigation, response, and recovery from emergency situations, be they natural or manmade. FEMA, through various programs at the federal, state, and local levels, develops and coordinates the execution of programs for emergency management, national emergency readiness, disaster planning, emergency training and education, fire prevention and control, flood plain management, and insurance operations.

The National Intelligence Council (NIC): The National Intelligence Council, managed by a Chairman and a Vice Chairman, is comprised of National Intelligence Officers--senior experts drawn from all elements of the Community and from outside the Government. The National Intelligence Officers concentrate on the substantive problems of particular geographic regions of the world and of particular functional areas such as economics and weapons proliferation. They serve the DCI in his role as leader of the Intelligence Community by providing a center for mid-term and long-term strategic thinking and production. Through routine close contact with policymakers, collection, research, and community analysis, the NIC provides the DCI with the information he needs to assist policymakers as they pursue shifting interests and foreign policy priorities. The NIC also draws on nongovernmental experts in academia and the private sector to bring in fresh perspectives and analytic methods to enhance the intelligence process.

Finally, the NIC assists the Intelligence Community by evaluating the adequacy of intelligence support and works with the Community's functional managers to refine strategies to meet the most crucial needs of our senior consumers.

Office of Management and Budget (OMB): OMB's predominant mission is to assist the President in overseeing the preparation of the Federal budget and to supervise its administration in the Executive Branch agencies. In such, OMB oversees the interlocking and overlapping mechanism of the Interagency to prevent duplication of effort and possible inappropriate resource allocation.

U.S. Information Agency (USIA): USIA's mission is to inform and influence foreign publics in the promotion of U.S. national interest. In addition, her mission is to improve understanding and communication with not only foreign governments but, moreover foreign populations. USIA has the capacity and capability to provide major contributions in the public affairs arena in support of crisis response and contingency operations. In such, the agency is able to mold popular support and enable the detection and countering of conditions which hinder U.S. operations.

Domestic Consequence Management

As delineated through PDD 39, the Federal Emergency Management Agency bears the responsibility for domestic consequence management. However, the responsibility for the program does not imply FEMA is an organization resourced with the necessary organic assets to accomplish the mission. In the case of a WMD terrorist attack the federal agency is the lead organization responsible for the coordination of the national effort necessary to overcome the challenges of the assault. In order to accomplish this mission the necessary tasks and duties have been highlighted and subsequently relegated throughout the federal, state, and local governments.

At the Federal level several agencies, in addition to FEMA, play key roles crucial to the successful mitigation of an attack. For instance, the Department of Justice's role is fundamental to the arrest and prosecution of those responsible for an attack. This important task is replete with difficult and many times conflicting challenges. The FBI attempts to ensure the rescue and safeguard of innocent civilians in and around the effected area. However, in order to accomplish another of their critical responsibilities the agency must establish a crime scene within the affected area. If they are not able to preserve and protect evidence, due to destruction while rescue operations are underway, the ability to prosecute those responsible vanishes. Without the ability to hold criminals accountable, the ability to deter future strikes likewise vanishes.

The interagency coordination effort encompasses a large variety of agencies and organizations; some of the major departments were previously discussed. In addition, on the macro level there exists an extensive list of highly specialized entities specifically

designed and fielded to either prevent the execution of a WMD event and, when not possible, to significantly reduce the impact of a detonated device. These organizations deal with an extremely wide range of missions such as radiation victim treatment, geographic quarantine establishment, and contaminated casualty disposal.

Many of these organizations operate in a consistent manner regardless of the location of the terrorist event. That is not to imply that all of the organizations that cooperate during a domestic consequence management event would do so during an international event. It is simply to clarify that if most operational and tactical organizations were tasked to assist with an international crisis their modus operandi would remain essentially the same. That is not the case with the DOD; based on legal direction the Department of Defense has established two distinctly different methods for dealing with consequence management.

Prior to elaborating on the DOD role in domestic consequence management, it must be clearly understood that the role of the department, in the federal system, is one of support. The ultimate goal of providing military assets to a catastrophic U.S. WMD event is saving lives, preventing injury, and establishing critical life support. However, prior to any federal military involvement, several factors must precede the application of assets. First, the local government must respond to the crisis and determine it is beyond their capability. Second, the State must respond with their assets and likewise determine it is beyond their capabilities. Finally where States have cooperative pacts with neighboring States, the affected State must determine the situation is beyond the control of those agreements. Then and only then should the State request Federal assistance.

These mechanisms have been painstakingly developed to alleviate civil libertarians' concerns for the rights of the States and, more importantly our constitutionally protected individual liberties. This is not to say that the Federal Government may not at some point move into a State, without a request, based on the seriousness of the situation. After all, terrorists are unlikely to attack New York City simply because they want to punish New York State for its sins. The fact of the matter is terrorist are enemies of the Nation and to attack the nation, on its soil, they will be forced to attack a target that lies within a State. Depending on the level of the attack and the medium used, the Federal Government may deem it necessary to operate unilaterally to protect the common national good.

In order to develop a mechanism to bridge the gap from the needs and wants of the state(s) to those of the nation the federal government has recently tasked the DOD to develop the capacity to respond to a domestic terrorist event. As called for in the Unified Command Plan 1999 (UCP 99), the United States Forces Command established a new standing Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS), headquartered at Ft. Monroe VA., to provide DOD consequence management support for domestic terrorist WMD events. The JTF-CS is a standing organization without assigned forces. Its specific missions include support to FEMA through the application of department assets capable of detection, decontamination, medical, and logistical support. While this type of civil support is not new, the robust use of federal military assets against enemies on U.S. soil is.

The maturation of the military into full-time domestic protection operations would seem logical, as the threat of large-scale strikes on sovereign U.S. lands has grown exponentially in the past several years. In fact the military has become increasingly

integrated into the civil protection and response configuration. Such was the case for the application of DOD capabilities developed for the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. Not only were there several highly technical DOD assets available in Atlanta, the 1st United States Army formed a Response Task Force (RTF) headquarters designed to completely integrate DOD assets with federal, state, and local officials. This temporary organization was established to ensure the core of the headquarters could fully amalgamate into the local governmental procedures and to ensure the staff's full education concerning the challenges and solutions available in response to an attack.

However, these temporary organizations, such as the Atlanta RTF, have exhausted their practicality in the face of a growing WMD threat. The Atlanta situation proved to be a superior test bed for the integration of domestic civil/military operations. However, many of the lessons from the success of that operation are not universally applicable to the capability to thwart future WMD events. For instance, the extensive time to prepare for the Games ensured the ability to diagnose probable areas of attack and develop best-case solutions to possible scenarios. Moreover, teams were established, trained, and equipped while facilities were procured to ensure any incident could and would be dealt with promptly. It is highly unlikely any future terrorist organization will provide enough warning as to enable the U.S. Government the luxury of training, deploying, and employing the same well intergraded force as was seen in Atlanta.

Once the utility and capability of the force, used for the Games, was noticed the government moved to develop a new force that could meet the same types of challenges but that was not tied to a specific city, state, or regional area. In order to meet the necessity of a time critical responsive force, the before mentioned JTF-CS was

established with its five core principles. First, the JTF-CS will always operate as a supporting organization to another federal agency, normally FEMA. Second, JTF-CS' chain of command and civilian oversight will be clear. In simplest terms the military will operate under complete civilian control. Third, the JTF-CS will conduct all operations with respect and sensitivity to the individual liberties and human freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution. Fourth, the JTF-CS will not be involved in long-term recovery operations - that is a civilian responsibility. Finally, the JTF-CS will fully exploit the unique capabilities of the National Guard and Reserve forces.

The JTF-CS is designed to operate under the full operational spectrum. With the exception of attempting to develop new doctrine, the headquarters operates much like that of any other. The main focus for the unit is education, training, exercises, planning, and preparing for possible future operations. Through the use of the deliberate planning process the JTF is developing procedures to tackle the challenges of chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, and large conventional weapons. In addition, the organization is attempting to develop threat scenarios to reduce the response time required and to identify the probable assets necessary for given types of attacks. These efforts are all designed to reduce response time and save lives.

This approach, establishing a standing JTF, has one tremendous benefit and one tremendous detriment. The cost of establishing and maintaining a standing JTF is staggering. If the organization remains simply a robust headquarters unit with slightly over a hundred assigned personnel the long-term costs are immense. However, the benefit of maintaining a standing JTF can be simply measured in our ability to effectively respond to a WMD terrorist event. Without such a structure it is highly questionable as to

America's ability to overcome the effects of a WMD without significant undue loss of life and possible grave economic damage.

The true test of the JTF-CS will not be realized until its reached full operational readiness. This unit will not only need to demonstrate the capability to develop cutting edge doctrine, it will be required to integrate competing DOD organizations and resources into a cohesive team. Not only will the macro issues of command and control be difficult, the capability to continually train staffs and field operatives, appears nearly impossible. Keep in mind this organization is a "no assigned forces" headquarters. The vast number of technical LDHD assets alone are so widely diversified that the assumption that any one organization, without ownership, can bond them into a well integrated team seems daunting. A review of just one such organization reveals some of the possibly insurmountable challenges.

While there are far too many supporting technical units to review in a study of this size, it is important to evaluate the status of at least one in an attempt to illustrate the challenges that are yet to be overcome. A snapshot of an expensive organization clearly identifies some glaring deficiencies in its makeup. The Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) is our nation's first attempt at a consequence management force. The unit is the 1995 brainchild of then Marine Corps Commandant General Charles C. Krulak, this 350 personnel sized organization was formed by drawing its members from those normally assigned to combat duties. CBIRF is comprised of naval and marine assets, including reconnaissance, detection, decontamination, medical, security, and service support elements.²⁹

Although relatively small in size this unit has an extremely robust capability. The CBIRF mission is philosophically straightforward: Provide the civilian incident site commander the assets and resources necessary to turn contaminated victims into treatable patients. While much easier said than done, many of the challenges associated with victim care surrounding a WMD incident have been overcome. For instance, the use of reach back technology, to scientific and medical consultants, has enabled a forward deployed force access to limited national expertise.

However, much like the rest of the current methodology used to tackle the, growing terrorism problem, the CBIRF is an ad hoc organization derived from standing forces to fill a neglected critical need. Instead of a unified DOD approach, the Marines in this case, developed a unique capability to engage the consequence management challenges. Not surprisingly the development of this unit parallels the before mentioned scramble to produce laws aimed at overcoming the problem. While these laws, and the CBIRF, are steps in the right direction the laws have had a tendency to compete with one another for scarce resources. Likewise, organizations, such as this Marine organization will never enjoy true joint forces support until they are sanctioned from the joint forces world. Thus, what may be the end result is a capable organization that weakens its parent service without producing the deployable and employable capability it was designed for.

In fact, some very troubling examples of a lack of capability can be derived from the CBIRF. First and foremost the unit was slashed from the already over tasked Marine Corps with no guarantees of future manpower backfills. In fact as of this writing the personnel required to operate the CBIRF have never been replenished at the unit level. The end result is yet another mission requirement on an already strained system. Fewer

Marines in the field are required to do the work of those departed for this special duty. In addition, the utility of the unit is also questionable; despite almost five years of attempting to secure dedicated organic airlift the CBIRF has failed in this critical requirement. Keep in mind the importance of a consequence management force must be measured not only in its inherent capabilities but must also be measured in its ability to rapidly arrive at the incident site. If the consequence management team is to arrive days after the event then the task at hand will more than likely involve little more than body bag loading and removal.

International Consequence Management

By definition a consequence management operation is just that, a consequence management operation. As such, the majority of the operation, regardless of its geographic location, remains constant. However, there are some important issues so central to the application of the force they bear discussion. An international consequence management operation is, of course, outside the United States, her territories, and protectorates. That simple fact plays the largest single role in determining America's response. As plain and simple as it can be put, the reaction, response, and recovery from an international WMD terrorist event is the responsibility of the nation where the incident occurred.

The nation of occurrence has become known as the "Host Nation" in interagency circles. The use of such a term has allowed the U.S. government to apply standards and develop policies for dealing with our international brothers during a wide spectrum of events and situations. This capstone nomenclature clearly enables the federal government to bind her roles and her perceived international responsibilities. In a nutshell, the term Host Nation enforces the global rule of law and the right of the sovereignty of foreign nations. The U.S. does not expect to unilaterally respond to an international WMD event without the request of the foreign government dealing with the situation. This well developed scheme not only enables the America to respond when requested, it acts as a buffer providing the USG the luxury of time to assess the situation prior to any actual dispatch in the way of support.

Although they may not be as critical as the Host Nation issue, there are several other differences that warrant review such as command and control, jurisdiction, and force application. The command and control of an international overseas WMD terrorist event has already been touched upon in the explanation of PDD 39. However, to further clarify the poignant issues consider and recall the following: during a domestic consequence management effort the LFA is FEMA, during an international consequence management effort the LFA is the DOS. As one might expect, the federal government expects to use its senior representative to interface, coordinate and intervene on our behalf.

The issue of jurisdiction is much broader than just the macro level interface of the host nation and USG. There is a significant difference in the relationship of an Ambassador, operating as America's point man abroad, and that of a state governor. While we have treaties and agreements with many nations, we certainly do not have them with every realm. And while the laws in our nation vary from state to state they do not vacillate nearly as dramatically as the laws from two nations with wide geographic separations. Moreover, there are cases where despite a dire need a host nation may be reluctant to seek U.S. assistance due to its fear of a probable large military composition force. Finally, there are many countries where the U.S. does not maintain a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). This critical issue may become more and more important as military personnel are forced to engage in operations that blur the lines of law enforcement. The protection of our military personnel is critical as they ever increasingly interface with civil populations. Thus, the jurisdictional challenges of placing U.S. personnel in harms way to aid a foreign government are vast and will require tireless diplomatic efforts following the request for U.S. intervention and assistance.

Force application philosophy is perhaps the most dramatic difference in the comparative doctrines of international and domestic consequence management. As already discussed the solution to overcome the critical issues of education, training, and time critical response led to the development, implementation, and execution of the new JTF-CS to ensure domestic response. Despite the stated need for such a force, or at a minimum a robust headquarters element, the international model is far different. The regional CINCs have been charged to develop their own endemic capability to handle the challenges of consequence management in their respective Area of Responsibility (AOR). Thus, in their own way, all of the commanders have developed plans, based on their endemic forces, to overcome the trials of an international terrorist WMD. These forces would be arrayed in an as necessary force composition most likely assigned to a newly formed JTF. The JTF headquarters would, more than likely, be staffed by CINC assigned staff personnel and the operational/tactical forces assigned would, more than likely, be filled from AOR assigned units with augmentation from the States.

It is important to examine the role and impact these differences play not only with regard to U.S. intervention and aid but, moreover, to address U.S. vulnerabilities.

A Force Disconnect

It would seem impractical to develop separate and distinct strategies for dealing with domestic and international consequence management. The similarity of organizations involved, regardless of the response location, and the limited availability of technical expertise, deployable medical assets, and subject matter trained field specialist, required to cope with a major terrorist WMD attack, would prevent the execution of such a two-tiered program. In simplest terms, the expertise and forces required to respond domestically would be nearly identical to those required to respond internationally.

Whether by design or happenstance, and despite the limitations, the two-tiered approach to consequence management is exactly what's being developed. As discussed, the United States Joint Forces Command, under the direction of the DOD, based on the last Quadrennial Defense Review, has established a standing Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS) to meet the challenges of DOD support to a domestic WMD terrorist attack. To meet the threat overseas, the United States regional Commander-in-Chiefs (CINC) are responsible for the military support to an international crisis in their Area of Responsibility (AOR). There exists a strong argument that the process of the regional CINC handling crisis, in their back yard, is exactly why they were established. Commanders build the necessary knowledge base and diplomatic relationships to effectively operate within the dynamics of the international arena.

However, as the global environment has evolved, so also have the CINC's missions grown and matured. At one time the major focus for the regional commanders was to hold an advancing army and ensure the movement and bed-down of follow-on assets

necessary to win the next war in his AOR. Those limited mission days are clearly over; the military is increasingly called upon to not only win wars, but to also to engage in peacekeeping, peace making, disaster relief, sanctions enforcement, and nation building. This shift and expansion in roles and missions has presented some unique problems associated with success. Several lessons learned from recent achievements, such as JTFs, have been misinterpreted into universal applicability.

Depending on the size and scope of the mission, the regional senior officer may choose to create a JTF to assess the problem, devise a strategy, and implement a solution. To ensure success of these missions, the CINCs continually educate and train their staffs, in the establishment and execution of JTF operations, in order to meet the wide range of challenges from the traditional to the non-traditional. Recent history has shown this to be an effective method for dealing with the normal military and the unexpected non-traditional military roles. The 1999 DOD East Africa flood relief effort, orchestrated by the U.S. Commander and Chief Europe (CINCEUR), is an excellent example of the unusually diverse missions that can be effectively executed through the use of a JTF. The flood relief operation was definitely a successful non-traditional process where combatant forces were used to locate; rescue, and transport victims while establishing a logistical infrastructure for long term recovery efforts.

In fact, the DOD has specifically designed and fielded its regional commands to overcome the emerging challenges in their respective AORs, such as the flood relief efforts. Mission challenges are conquered either through endemic forces, through the use of reach back assets, or a combination of the two. The success of the East Africa

operation, and countless other such missions, has grown and has had some surprising negative side effects.

First, the comfort level of the CINCs and their ability to independently meet growing requirements has fostered a potentially dangerous atmosphere. The “meet any challenge” milieu approach is admirable however, unrealistic in relation to the challenges of a WMD terrorist attack. While the forward based military forces have shown a remarkable versatility, the ability to respond to the enormity in the aftermath of a WMD attack is not in the same category as flood relief and peace enforcement, not to mention the plethora of difficult unanswered politically explosive situations that the first such attack is bound to birth.

For instance, if a biological weapon is effectively released in a residential neighborhood, will the authorities be forced to establish a buffered “Hot Zone”? Will the “Hot Zone” include a bulwark with healthy non-affected individuals included inside to protect the population outside the target area? What will be the containment method; find the sick move two houses outside and then quarantine everything inside using a two-house buffer? How will you control the masses seeking care? What of the individuals that refuse the quarantine, will they be shot? Who will be forced to make the life and death decision to enforce the blockade, a young Sergeant in a newly formed JTF?

How are the soldiers on the ground to deal with the challenges of a large-scale effective VX nerve agent chemical attack? How do you rapidly dispose of the thousands of dead to prevent the associated problems? To prevent widespread disease how do you cleanup the tens of thousands of dead animals in the effected area? How can you treat the thousands of victims that survived the attack but have dire respiratory needs?

What of a radiological attack where a large conventional weapon is detonated to spread tiny particles of lethal isotopes within a dense structural area such as Frankfurt Germany? Is it even possible to return the area to a habitable environment? How will you deal with the time critical evacuation of the city inhabitants? Will you have local expertise to overcome the health problems associated with the exposure?

Second, the time required to establish and field a regional JTF would prevent the force from having a strong positive effect on the outcome of the situation. One of the critical missions of a successful consequence management force is its ability to provide a strong deterrent. International terrorists must know that despite their ability to successfully accomplish an attack, the country is able to minimize the overall impact of even a successful operation. In essence, the goal is rendering the amount of effort required to perpetrate the attack not to be worth the end results. This requires a force capable of near real time reactions. A look into one of the current CINC plans would prove effective, at a minimum, on the time line issue.

According to an unclassified briefing on Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 1205, the well-developed U.S. Central Command (CINTCOM) consequence management model requires 12 days to fully deploy and employ its consequence management force. Imagine in the biological example above the situation after 12 days. How wide spread would the devastation reach without the use of timely judicious quarantines? Moreover, to what greater degree would the loss of life be without an immediate robust medical response? The illogical force application does not end there; the establishment of the JTF headquarters and the majority of its forward forces are normally staffed internally by the regional commander. Yet the personnel with the expertise level required to combat the

aftermath effects of a WMD attack are universally very limited. The CINCs officer corps will be forced to address situations far beyond their perspective areas of know-how. How effective will an in-theater JTF be while simultaneously attempting to establish itself and grapple with an unknown environment replete with relatively uncharted challenges? It's not unreasonable to argue the leadership involved in the nations JTF-CS are not truly ready to tackle the challenges from a level of attack causing possibly tens of thousands of casualties, much less a JTF rapidly established in the aftermath of disaster.

Third, the technically sophisticated highly diversified requirements necessary to control the repercussions from a WMD event prohibit the application of a force that has not been equipped, trained, and extensively exercised to address the specific challenges associated with catastrophic terrorist events. One need only review the extensive list of organizations required to respond after an effective attack. As stated in a GAO report focused on terrorism exercises, the number of organizations involved in WMD reaction, and containment has grown dramatically over the past ten years. Consequently, from 1996 through 1999 the number of federal government exercises specifically derived to address the challenges of a WMD attack rose 236% for a total of 201 events.³⁰ This growth can be directly contributed to the growing realization that the threat is genuine and that the only effective manor to synergistically operate these newly formed uniquely staffed units is to exercise. Unfortunately, the amalgamation of the growing number of organizations, across several layers of worldwide command, requires more time than is literally available.

As the growth in organizational entities involved has grown so has the complexity of developing an infrastructure capable of interweaving diverse capabilities into a cohesive

effort. Imagine the challenges associated with the operational command of a newly formed JTF as the leadership cadre is faced with operational and technical challenges ranging from biological quarantine to radiological contamination. Moreover, consider the obstacles of integrating such diverse organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, the Department of Transportation, the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the National Security Council just to name a few.

Who in the federal government, much less in the military, has the experience and training necessary to foster a synergistic atmosphere drawing upon the unique strengths of such diverse organizations? More importantly, how many of these individuals exist worldwide? Should the U.S. government expect the military to be stockpiled with such individuals who are well enough trained and educated in the unique aspects of these diverse governmental departments, as to build them into a cohesive team in a time critical situation?

Moreover, the myriad of possible situations a consequence management force may be forced to operate in, further complicate the use of an ad-hoc JTF. While the possibilities are far from endless, the complications from a mixed bag attack would more than likely overwhelm an organization unaccustomed to the unique aspects associated with a nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological attack.

Fourth, the ability to effectively train not only the CINC's staff and his endemic forces but to train the LDHD forces to integrate effectively over five geographic regions, not to mention American soil, is untenable. To reiterate, the GAO's report on Interagency

WMD terrorist exercises described the number for 1995 through 1998 at 201. That's 201 exercises, an average of 70 a year, or in simple terms more than one a week! In order to be effective these exercises are designed and developed to train not only the Interagency leadership but to attempt to ensure the entire range of personnel, from national leaders through the CINC's staffs, are prepared to engage and overcome the challenges associated with both crisis and consequence management situations. Is it possible to accomplish this task at a rate of more than one a week?

How thin can the LDHD assets be spread? Is it remotely possible to effectively train the responders to integrate into U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Joint Forces Command? Moreover, is it possible to train potential future JTF personnel well enough to expect they would be capable of dealing with the complete range of ever expanding non-traditional military missions? And what can be done to improve the stabilities of the CINC's staff's? On a normal rotational basis staffs will turn over one third of their members annually. How is it possible to keep the staffs in five AORs trained and prepared with the new missions and to add WMD response with this type of turnover?

Fifth, consider the growing strain on the world wide combatant forces and their responsibility to bear yet another mission with an entirely new set of tasks and requirements. How much time, effort, and resources will brigades and battalions be forced to commit to the introduction, training, and maintenance of this new skill set? How much further will the combat skills of units deteriorate as the number of non-traditional roles increase?

Results of a Two-tiered Approach

Based on several of the before mentioned laws, directives, and program initiatives the federal government is in the process of developing a limited capability to equip, field, and train the forces required to effectively cope with a major terrorist WMD attack on U.S. sovereign soil. However, the same cannot be said for the effort to deal with a similar event abroad. Apparently, the driving factor preventing the establishment of an effective overarching consequence management policy is the lack of an established mission and/or direction. Again, this seeming lack of a national strategic vision has resulted in an undesirable environment.

This lack of vision is a critical flaw in an expensive extensive interagency program. It would be difficult to identify any singular governmental effort with the amount of effort and/or resources being expended on the consequence management program that does not have a coherent mission. Yet, due to the diversification of federal agencies, their sometimes-conflicting paradigms, and no clear national guidance, the divergence in solutions continues to grow. Without an articulated mission the program will continue to progress without a clear end-state. And in fact, instead of an agenda that ensures the nation is as prepared and capable of dealing with a major WMD terrorist attack the country will remain vulnerable.

What is clear is this: We are developing a capability to deal with the aftermath of a WMD terrorist attack. The capability is in the form of two separate and distinct forces. Domestically, the JTF-CS will integrate military support to the Lead Federal Agency. Internationally, the CINCs, in consultation with the Ambassador, will determine the level of effort that is appropriate and what will be offered to the host nation. The application

of force and/or assistance domestically may take a matter of days. The application of force and/or assistance internationally may take a matter of weeks.

The U.S. Military in CM?

Unfortunately, we as of yet are not nearly well enough prepared to handle a domestic terrorist WMD event much less an international event. In reaction to FEMA's responsibility for domestic consequence management the federal agency questions our own ability to respond. "It is possible [following a WMD attack] that the perimeter will be closed until the effects of the NBC material have degraded to levels that are safe for first responders."³¹ In laymen's terms, following the attack the possibility exists that the government would isolate the contaminated area until the chemical or biological agent had run its course.

The U.S. military finds itself in the unenviable position of dealing with a significant increase in nontraditional military operations. There are a surfeit number of reasons for these new tasking, far too many and irrelevant issues to be addressed in this study. However, it is important to understand that, at a minimum and for the foreseeable future, the Department of Defense will be required to not only participate but also in many cases bear the heavy burden of dealing with a major terrorist event.

This reality has not been lost on the Department of Defense's senior leadership. The Secretary of Defense clearly stated, "is there any other institution in this country that has the organizational capability, the logistics capability, other than the Department of Defense, to respond, to provide transportation, to move medicines and personnel, hospital beds, etc., other than the Department of Defense? And so we need to start that debate in

terms of tensions that will exist. What happens if you have a serin gas attack in New York or DC or L.A. or wherever it could take place? Who is to respond?"³²

While Secretary Cohen certainly believes so the question remains, should the United States military be involved in consequence management? This seemingly simplistic question is anything but simplistic. Consequence management as has been described in the past several pages is a very complex process attempting to mold a wide range of environments from that of potential, or present, disaster to one of a controlled systematic recovery operation. It should not be a foregone conclusion that the development and fielding of the nation's ability to combat this challenge should be levied on the military. After all, it would seem that if FEMA and the DOS are responsible for the execution of the CM programs they could be funded and manned to accomplish the task without reassigning combatant forces into yet another required adjunct mission.

The inclusion of the military into an ever-increasing number of mission requirements has implications over a considerable range of issues. Many of which, such as readiness, operations tempo, and personnel tempo, have been widely publicized in the past several years. The impact of peacekeeping, peace making, sanctions enforcement, disaster relief, and several other tasks, along with near static budgets, has had a drastic effect on overall measurable military readiness and retention. Add the potential impact on the military as the consequence management requirements become more clearly understood and another perceived assault on the two big "Rs" of readiness and retention becomes crystal clear.

Equally important to the tangible effects of additional requirements on the strained military are the more elusive issues such as public opinion and leadership perception. Military leaders perceived the aftermath of the situation in Waco Texas and the DOJ poor

handling of the long siege as potentially disastrous to the DOD. Remember the Congressional investigation into the failure and the potentially explosive questions as to the military's possible inclusion in the shootings and heated debates over the military helicopter use? Senior military leaders were forced to elaborate not only as to why U.S. military forces were in Waco but moreover to the exact support provided. Never forget, the DOD leadership has labored tirelessly to instill and maintain the general U.S. populace's confidence and support in the institution. That type of confidence could easily be jeopardized through the improper use of military personnel in domestic civil law enforcement.

Despite the arguments, the impact on readiness, and the ramifications of military use in traditional civilian duties, the use of the military in consequence management operations are, at a minimum in the short term, inevitable. The truth of the matter is that, for the foreseeable future, the DOD will be involved in the process. In fact, based on the laws and directives previously discussed the military will play not just an important but a pivotal role in the nation's CM efforts. With that backdrop in place what unique attributes can the Services bring to our effort to combat the terrorist enemies of America?

Truly the Department of Defense's unique ability, and adaptability, to operate across a colossal number of environments and within an enormous number of circumstances solidifies her place in the development and initial force structure composition of any CM effort. While not an exhaustive list, at least four major categories of support anchor the DOD contributions. First, the Department's foremost reason for existence is to fight and win the nation's wars. The organization is, by definition, called upon to deal with and

overcome America's enemies. This is a unique characteristic and is an important element in the military's inclusion in CM.

The fact that an attack on America and/or on vital American interests abroad is carried out by an enemy of the country must be recognized. As important is the recognition that there exist U.S. enemies, with the sufficient means and resolve who are more than willing to conduct a large-scale WMD terrorist action. In essence, these two simplistic facts must eventually lead to an organization capable of countering this newly emerging threat. The counter-threat organization must be capable of not only responding to the possible circumstances following an attack; it must be capable of dealing with an enemy that has anticipated U.S. response to its attack. The unfortunate aftermath of any successful WMD terrorist attack will become far worse if our response plays into the hands of intelligent madmen who have anticipated our moves and are lying in wait to execute the follow on phases of their attack. It would be naive to believe terrorists willing to use a massive WMD assault will be satisfied with the effects of the initial attack when they may be able to significantly improve their intended outcome by planning "branches and sequels" to their operation. Thus, any counter-organization must possess the ability to rapidly discern enemy intent, likely follow on operations, and implement appropriate precautions. This is exactly what the military deals with daily in wartime planning.

Second, in addition to countering an enemy the organization must be capable of dealing with the medium the enemy intends to use. In the case of WMD, the vast majority of the forces that will be called upon to respond to the aftermath of an attack reside within the DOD. Where else but in the military will the nation currently find individuals and organizations trained and equipped to operate in the hostile environments that are the

aftermath of such attacks? While there are several non-military key individuals and layers of bureaucracies designed to lend specific expertise, the tactical level of response will be comprised largely of military individuals if the environment is or is potentially a hot zone. These responders will be called upon to not only prevent the detonation and or release of the weapons if possible, they will be called upon to use their unique weapons knowledge and understanding to control and minimize the consequences if the prevention is unsuccessful.

Further complicating an already difficult problem are the various mediums collectively grouped into the lexicon known as weapons of mass destruction. While this collective grouping of weapons simplifies a complex problem into one that can be more easily studied, it ignores critical differences in the implementation of a sound consequence management process. Specifically, each and every category of WMD, be it nuclear, chemical, or biological requires unique controls in the consequence management arena.

The release of a potent chemical weapon in a large urban area will pose a significantly different challenge to authorities than that of the release of an equally potent biological weapon. Consider the situation, earlier described, at the New York World Trade Center. If the cyanide had been disbursed, it is possible that there may have been several thousand casualties. However, once the chemical had disbursed, there would be no new victims. Thus, the challenge becomes decontamination of the victims, transportation to medical facilities, and the cleanup of the dead.

Conversely, the use of a biological weapon would more than likely require authorities to establish a containment area. In order to prevent the further spread of the

disease, the victims of the attack would need to be isolated. Unfortunately, unlike the blast of the nuclear weapon or the immediate effects of poisonous gas, a biological attack may be nearly impossible to diagnose with sufficient speed as to isolate the affected area. Thus, what in the first example would be a response to the dead and dieing would manifest itself far differently if the first signs of an attack were throngs seeking medical care at local clinics.

In order to achieve their desired effects, it is highly unlikely that terrorists would disburse a biological weapon in a fashion that would attract attention. The agent would be delivered and allowed to incubate in its victims. If carried out in a major urban area such as Los Angeles, Seattle, or Miami hundreds or perhaps thousands of victims may unknowingly travel throughout the globe spreading the disease completely unaware of their infected status. So, while a chemical attack could be crippling to the affected community the worldwide threat of a successful biological attack is far more significant. The incubation time delay and contagiousness propensity of a biological weapon will be a significant factor; in fact, the occurrence of the attack is likely to not be fully realized on the contaminated populace for days. Imagine the impact on global stability with individual travelers spreading death unknowingly. Further, imagine the effort required to respond to not one city but perhaps several.

While the procurement and/or manufacture of a full-scale nuclear weapon may pose some insurmountable obstacles to the average terrorist, the widespread dispersal of highly radioactive isotopes may not. So, while it may be unlikely that the average terrorist organization could cause the U.S. fallout problems from a detonated weapon, it is highly possible that they could contaminate a large area using conventional explosive to disperse

the medium. If a successful radiological attack were accomplished who in the America government would be called upon to contain and then clean the affected area? Presently there are no organizations, outside the DOD, capable of deploying the resources necessary to operate safely within these wide-ranging possibilities in a large-scale manor. Consider the challenges of turning victims into patients following a high yield blast, or the expertise required to cleanse a radiologically contaminated area. Possibly even more important consider the leverage necessary to ensure local responders will risk their lives in an environment they are minimally prepared to deal with. As unpalatable as it may be, the fact of the matter is military personnel are obligated, by law, to follow orders. Many times these orders can result in the loss of life for the individual executing the commands of a superior officer. That type of leverage is simply not available using local responders. And the response to such a disaster will be life threatening to the rescue personnel. Most Americans remember the widely publicized courageous Russian helicopter pilot who risked his life to help seal the disaster at Chernobyl. Most Americans also remember that man lost his life to the radiation exposure.

Third, there exists a unique capability within the Defense Department to successfully operate in a wide range of extremely hazardous environments, as in the radiological example discussed above. Due to the military necessity of functioning in a wartime atmosphere that includes nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, the DOD repeatedly trains virtually every member of the armed services to not only survive in these conditions but moreover operate in them. This is a capability the vast majority of civil authorities simply do not possess. Yet, it should go without saying that if any one of the before mentioned WMD devices were used against America, a massive relief effort

would be required and that effort, at the grass roots level, must be executed by individuals continually trained and equipped to effectively operate in these extremely hazardous conditions. There is an argument that says local governments should simply train and equip local responders (mayors, city and county councilmen, firemen, policemen, ...); however, imagine the staggering cost to the American taxpayer to equip and train literally every fireman and every policeman. Despite the overwhelming cost to simply train and equip the local leadership and individual responders that is by no means an inclusive list of the total expenses should the country move to that model.

Fourth, the responding organization must have the capability to operate on a level that enables recovery instructions to be carried out. This capacity, more often than not, will necessitate a robust logistical system to include transportation and transportable communications capability. While some large major metropolitan areas have backup communications capabilities, the country is not universally equipped with the type of instrumentation that allows for transmission of critical information and resources in a hostile environment. In addition to the ability to deliver and execute basic recovery instructions, the affected area will most likely need significant assistance in the medical arena. Depending on the type and severity of the attack, the local hospitals may not even be able to respond to the most basic needs. As discussed earlier, it is quite possible the attackers would target the hospitals directly or in a subsequent move to make the recovery more difficult and prolong the misery. Thus, the use of the military's robust transportable hospital systems would be almost inevitable. Finally, the basics of post attack logistical support requirements would overwhelm the vast majority of local governments. Consider just the need for heavy transportation equipment necessary to

move the men and support equipment into and out of the effected area, much less the ability to decontaminate it.

These before mentioned unique capabilities and others, make the DOD an indispensable member of the initial domestic consequence management team. In reality the argument is not whether or not the military should be involved but more importantly how will it be involved? Will the effort level impede the military's ability to respond to a traditional crisis, such as the invasion of Kuwait? Finally, what should any future consequence management force structure be molded after: an ad hoc force as is being currently developed by the CINCs, a standing JTF Headquarters devoid of forces such as is the case with JTF-CS, or a standing JTF with assigned forces and assets capable of rapidly responding when and if necessary?

One thing is certain, we are currently not prepared for an event of this magnitude. In a collaborative report submitted to Congress in 1996 on the current consequence management capabilities and plans, the DOD, DOE, and FEMA unequivocally reiterated the necessity of immediate federal intervention following a WMD terrorist attack. This conclusion was reached following the recognition that "mass casualties, physical damage, and potential for civil disorder" would be of a magnitude greater than the capacity of any local government to handle. The report codified the necessity to use any and all means necessary, including the military, to mitigate an attack. "Simply stated, a terrorist use or potential use of a WMD is considered a vital threat to the national security of the United States."³³ Without a capable consequence management force in place, the unfortunate accidental or deliberate detonation of a chemical, biological, or nuclear device will not only pose great challenges on American soil it will likewise pose great challenges to any

Host Nation. We must not forget the CM force will operate as our primary force protection asset to our men and women combating the terrorists. Without a CM force in place, we risk fostering an environment replete with unnecessary peril.

Why Not Leave It to Someone Else?

The previous discussion clearly demonstrates the high probability that the U.S. military will be called upon to respond to any worldwide WMD situation that threatens global stability and/or is deemed in the vital national interest of the United States. However, no discussion of the current force structure can be complete without an examination of two remaining entities and their possible impact on an international WMD situation. The first, and possibly the most important, is the Host Nation (HN) and the remaining is a collective known as Non-Governmental Organization(s) or NGOs.

The concept of host nations and more importantly host nation responsibilities cannot and must not be minimize. The fact that America alone remains the sole global “superpower” does not dictate that she’s the world's 911 force. If a chemical, biological or nuclear attack should occur overseas, the affected country should and would bear the brunt of not only the attack but the recovery and consequences as well. However, it must be clearly understood that despite our strategically disjointed international and domestic doctrine on consequence management may be, America retains the best overall capacity to deal with a terrorist WMD event. Make no mistake; our allies will call on us for significant assistance in a crisis of this magnitude.

There are several situations that will compel our involvement despite our misgivings. For instance, if the attack is specifically aimed at our nation and occurs in any area where there exists a large contingent of Americans citizens, if the attack occurs on or near a U.S. Embassy, or if the attack occurs on a major U.S. military installation we will respond in order to ensure the survival of our citizens and protect our international

stature. In addition to our responsibility to protect our own, we, as a nation, desire an atmosphere conducive to the promotion of free trade and democracy. This is yet another motivation for our response to an event that could prove extremely disruptive to the global economy and ultimately to our own domestic economic strength.

The level, and maybe more importantly the necessities, of support to various nations will also vary widely with specific international governmental capabilities. It is quite likely that nations with a burgeoning GDP will follow America's lead in the development of a response mechanism capable of dealing with the aftermath of a WMD attack. It is also likely that many nations, that remain vital to America, will be unable to field a force with the technical sophistication and infrastructure resources necessary to combat WMD terrorism; they will continue to rely on the U.S. Our nation's ability to respond should not be driven by either of these two HN realities; it should instead be clear we require this type of rejoinder capacity in the future to protect our own needs regardless of developments abroad.

In addition to the supporters of "foreign governments handle foreign government problems", there are those that promote the idea of NGOs playing a significantly more important role in future relief operations to include WMD recovery. While an attractive proposal the realities of the physical post WMD environment all but prevent this possibility in the near term. The vast majority of the NGO's are nonprofit charitable groups established to reduce the pain and suffering of individuals following certain types of manmade and/or natural disasters. Typically these organizations are either called upon or simply respond to situations such as famine and flood relief. In some cases these groups respond to the aftermath of civil and state-to-state wars. However, these

collectives do not routinely, and in many cases never, respond to hostile wartime situations.

The majority of the NGOs have basic criteria they employ as a litmus test prior to the application of their limited resources to any given situation. Along with a reasonable chance for success, the norm among these groups is an environment that is stable enough to again ensure the logical success of the mission. In laymen's terms, the groups need a controlled post conflict atmosphere. In addition, almost all of these groups carry international insurance. While many would wonder what in the world insurance has to do with disaster relief, the answer is plenty. The underwriters of the NGO insurance policies have imposed significant restrictions on the areas where these groups can operate. Perhaps better said, the affordability of insurance to charitably funded NGOs limits their ability to operate in hostile arenas. And without insurance, the NGO'S have no chance of obtaining airlift, sealift, and other critical infrastructure support apparatus necessary to their deployments, without deployments there is no relief operation.

Finally, there is a growing interest in "NGO type" organizations willing to respond to situations of this type for pay. By definition, that deletes them from the group of non-profit organizations. However, for the sake of simplicity, consider an NGO type WMD response for hire. As the U.S. Government seemingly continues to move more and more toward out-sourcing this alternative methodology or approach's magnetism has grown. Plainly, there is a major weakness in this approach to CM. Envision an international situation critical to the vital national interest of the United States. Envision further the nation has developed a response program based on out-sourcing. Finally,

envision the response situation is particularly dangerous. Remember, the organizations and their personnel are under contract to respond; they are not bound as the nation's military is so bound. It is quite plausible contracted companies and/or individuals may deem the situation too grave and refuse to deploy. Can the U.S. government expect to force civilians contractors working for the Department of Energy to travel to nuclear hazard areas around the globe? Can the U.S. government expect to force civilian doctors working on contract to travel to biological hot zones? More importantly, can the U.S. government expect that it can force contracted companies or individuals to respond to a chemical disaster area? The likely legal action may result in significant fines and contractual cancellations; however, the country could be left holding the proverbial bag. How devastating would the release of a WMD be if the forces arrayed to combat the terrorist attack were unwilling and not criminally bound to respond?

The attractiveness of shouldering the responsibility of international consequence management on host nations and/or NGOs must not interfere with sound judgment. While both will play a pivotal role in the initial response and in the long-term recovery efforts neither has the ability nor motivation to ensure the needs of the United States are met. What does it profit us to have the capacity to respond to a New York attack only to leave a similar assault on Berlin in the laps of our German allies? Yet, we continue on a "head in the sand" developmental program to field a force to respond only to a CONUS crisis.

Conclusion

The following five problem areas represent just a few, macro issues, of the shortfalls associated with the current direction of the nation's counter/anti terrorism program. Many more exist; however, while the inclusion of these areas may strengthen the argument that we are truly proceeding in a reactionary verses proactive nature they in fact would only be additive to what is clearly a process without strategic direction.

Mitigation Deterrence Philosophy:

The use of a credible deterrence has afforded the United States the luxury to grow in economic, military, and diplomatic stature for many years. Arguably, the policy and/or philosophy of mutually assured destruction from the Cold War enabled the United States to deal effectively with the former Soviet Union. However, the international situation has changed dramatically over the past ten years. The United States has transitioned from a global situation focused almost exclusively on exterior threats from states to a growing vision that includes threats from factions within states. Moreover, it can now be easily argued that threats from intra-state conflicts are more likely to cause American involvement than those from a two-nation conflict. The occurrence of intra-state conflicts has skyrocketed; the fact is the United States is significantly more apt to become involved than at any other time in her history.

This propensity for global engagement in matters that may be viewed as interference in sovereign nation affairs has increased the likelihood that America will not only remain but grow as a target for terrorist. Unfortunately, the successful implementation of the

deterrence strategy to thwart terrorist attacks such as the old mutually assured destruction doctrine is elusive. The lack of a clear strategy and the lack of a force to implement that strategy have created a deterrence gap.

A credible consequence management force is of itself a deterrent to terrorist actions. Consider the typical terrorist motives of visibility, perception management, perceived enemy, and policy modification. Mitigation of the desired terrorist end state by limiting his influence will deter his actions. As described by Analytic Services, Inc. (ANSER) in their recent Homeland Defense study, "An effective means of communicating and coordinating response to an attack will minimize a terrorist probability of success and possibly discourage him from launching an attack in the first place." More strongly worded, "In other words, readiness complements both prevention and deterrence by communicating our ability and will to mitigate the effects of CBRN/Cyber attack." ³⁴

Cost:

The undesirable reality of combating terrorism, and more specifically WMD terrorism, is the exorbitant cost. Historically the development and implementation of new capabilities is a costly business. This is not a uniquely military nor governmental issue. While the development of the atomic bomb required a phenomenal commitment of resources so also did the development of the first calculator and the first personal computer. However, in all of these cases, and countless more, the end result was worth the expenditure.

The difficulty in funding counter terrorism, and more specifically international consequence management, is determining who pays the bill. Should the resources, as stated in PDD 39³⁵, gouge the already strained Department of State, Federal Bureau of

Investigation, and Department of Defense budgets, or should new monies be allocated from the federal treasury to thwart this emerging threat?

The fact is, if we as a nation are to legitimately contain the consequences of international terrorism, we must allocate the funds. As with any program be it governmental or of the private sector in nature, a lack of resources will doom the process. As reported by the Defense Department to the Congress in its domestic preparedness program in the defense against weapons of mass distraction: "The key to success, however, is continued funding through the out of years to ensure that all agencies, local, state, regional, and federal, are adequately prepared to respond to a WMD terrorist attack."³⁶

Criticality of time:

Not only must we be able to resource a force capable of dealing with international WMD terrorist events, we must construct a force structured to overcome the enormous challenges presented by such a catastrophic event. A cornerstone capability of such a force must be its ability to rapidly deploy. Otherwise, we may develop and field the most capable consequence management force in the world only to witness its ineffectiveness in time of need.

One only need consider the known release of a biological weapon in a large suburban area such as London. Assume the British government requested immediate assistance from her American ally. If the Department of State and the Department of Defense were to fully mobilize, under current plans, it may require twelve days to fully provide the requested assistance. Meanwhile, the biological agent continues its deadly rampage irrespective of the frenzied American effort.

Is a rapid response capability truly necessary? It would seem that at a minimum the senior leadership at the state level in our country believe so. The National Governors Association meeting in September 1996 highlighted the immediate need for timely consequence management assistance, during the response to a WMD event. "Public information issues explain the need to present fully coordinated, timely, and accurate emergency information to the public and the importance of considering the objectives in consequence management vs. crisis management." Moreover, "the groups highlighted the need for subject matter experts to be identified and available within the first few hours of an incident. The subject matter experts would provide advice and reference materials describing the hazards, the effects and recommended protective response actions."³⁷ A twelve-day response timeline hardly fills the "hours" requirement.

Temporal Distortion:

While we continue to enhance our capabilities to respond domestically to a WMD terrorist attack, U.S. overseas responsiveness has advanced only due to our domestic improvements. The United States government must first be concerned with protecting her citizenry; however, she must also come to grips with the implications of an international WMD assault. Unfortunately, at the highest levels of our government, we seem content to ensure our domestic CM process grows while our international CM process flounders. Attorney General Reno summed up, what may be the cornerstone of the U.S. consequence management doctrine: "But make no mistake, there is no confusion that the first priority of all concerned is the saving of lives."³⁸ Then to clarify how to protect lives Mrs. Reno went on to state the USG clearly stated position is its ability to respond, with forces in the field, within 96 hours to a domestic terrorist event.³⁹ Yet as a

counter example, CINTCOM's unclassified plans clearly states the consequence management force may require twelve days to be in place.

This disconnect in strategic philosophy is puzzling. Consider the joint Federal Emergency Management Agency/Federal Bureau of Investigation report submitted to Congress in January 1997. It clearly stated "A NBC terrorist incident may occur as a local event with potentially profound national implications. In responding to an NBC incident, first responders must be able to provide critical resources within minutes to mitigate the effects of the incident." Further, the report seriously called into question America's domestic capabilities to deal with such an event.

FEMA and the FBI are by no stretch of the imagination the only federal agencies that articulate the necessity for timely consequence management. The April 1996 DOD/DOE report to Congress described the interagency opinion. "The interagency community found that including consequence management experts from the very beginning of a crisis management response was absolutely essential for minimizing casualties, reducing public panic, in ensuring a rapid federal response to state and local communities."⁴⁰

How much more difficult would responding to a WMD situation be overseas? There exists a requirement for a viable consequence management response abroad. Unfortunately, there also exist pundits that will tout "Host Nation" responsibilities. This is a convenient marquee to hide behind. After all, shouldn't the Japanese government look after Japan, the British government after England, and the Chinese government after China? Why should America take on this costly role?

The simple answer is globalization; America's strategic interests are integrated and interwoven throughout the diversified economies of the world. In a perfect situation, the

affected country could and would handle the devastation of the event. However, in those situations where the affected country was unable, the United States, because of her strategic interests, would be compelled to assist. Put simply, the cost for being unprepared will be significantly higher than the cost of preparedness.

Ability to Train:

The ability of regional Commanders-in-Chiefs to rapidly stand up and execute a joint task force for consequence management is questionable. A commonly understood requirement, for the success of any military organization, rests on its ability to train forces, conduct exercises, and perform evaluations. How is it possible to train the burgeoning number of subject matter expert low-density high demand forces across five regional commanders? Can anyone expect a rapidly organized group of individuals to be instantly conversant in the wide array of possibilities a WMD terrorist situation may present? Consider the challenges presented to the newly formed staff as they attempt to integrate the deploying WMD field experts. Further, consider the stress of not only constructing an effective JTF team but the pressure cooker atmosphere of a situation where minutes literally mean the loss of life. The proposed solution of attempting to exercise consequence management experts alongside regional joint task forces in every area once a year would be untenable. Can you imagine the requirements on the LDHD units and individuals assigned to consequence management efforts? Moreover, can you imagine the result of “balanced” training versus deployment environment where certain area staffs remain untrained due to an “acceptable risk” program?

The results of having a force not optimally trained in consequence management could be devastating. Training requirements are far different in the CM arena than those

necessary for combat operations. For instance and as mentioned earlier, the requirement to protect evidence for the prosecution purposes has never traditionally been necessary in combat employment operations. However, terrorists must be fairly prosecuted in an international court of law and that requires evidence. As an unidentified FBI agent stated during the Atlanta games, you may have lots of dead folks now but if we can't prosecute the bad guys you'll have lots more dead folks later.

Finally, while the organization and training of any JTF share some similar attributes, the leadership and subject matter expertise required to effectively operate any given task are not always universally applicable. In the rapidly changing global environment of the past ten years JTF training has become a growth industry. No longer is it sufficient to ensure staffs are capable of devising plans for combat intervention, non-combatant evacuations, and embassy protection. Possible JTF staffs must be widely versed in United Nations sanctions enforcement rules and regulations, successful peace keeping and peace enforcement techniques, humanitarian relief in permissive and non-permissive environments, not to mention the need to understand the impact and growing requirement to appreciate ethnic heritage issues and how they are shaping global events. Now, add the new task of CM to these staffs, with all the intricacies involved. Judge if this is possible in a staff that completely transitions every three years.

Recommendations

Does the deterrent and mitigation of the effects from WMD terrorists' attacks belong in the category of America's enduring interest? Based on the probability that a successful large-scale attack would fundamentally change the global landscape, not to mention American civil liberties, the answer must be a resounding absolutely. If only the Tokyo exchange was destroyed or disrupted how devastating would that be to America's economy? If a devastating biological device were successfully disbursed, in a major U.S. city, would the citizens of the United States ever again enjoy true freedom of movement? There can be no question that the government of the United States must develop and field an organization or a collective of organizations to combat terrorism with such lethal potential. The question is should the nation remain on her present course with seemingly fractured departmental philosophies and competing organizational paradigms?

As an alternative approach, the country should begin a robust top to bottom review of our current counter/anti terrorism laws, procedures, and guidance's. In essence, what is necessary is a full review utilizing an individual or individuals who will not be forced into biased recommendations because of their position or a seeming threat to their position. The end result of this review should, at a minimum, produce the following; a strategic doctoral plan for combating terrorism, a commitment and a means to pay the cost for combating terrorism, and finally direction and a timeline for the fielding, equipping, training, and exercising a counter terrorism force with both the capability and capacity to operate in the crisis management and consequence management arenas.

The ability to integrate such diverse organizations as the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Department, to name a few, will be a daunting if not seemingly an insurmountable task. In order to accomplish such a mission those responsible will need to full power and leverage of the law. Much like the case for integrating the military into true joint operations, and limiting the propensity towards parochial behavior, there, prior to 1986, existed a void in motivation to better amalgamate the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. However, when the 1986 Goldwater/Nichols Act was passed the law forced its way through several previously intractable obstacles. Likewise, that same process could be employed to integrate the widely diverse interagency members and moreover would significantly improve the aimless current vector. General Zinni, former CENTCOM commander and a man intimately involved in the interagency process, witness to its strengths and weaknesses, summed up his view in this manner: "we need a Goldwater/Nichols for the interagency."⁴¹

The outcome of a Goldwater/Nichols Act for the interagency must include a well-developed detailed phased approach backed by the law. Whenever possible, every effort must be made to alleviate and eliminate areas for interpretation. The law should clearly delineate each and every agency's responsibilities and duties. Who'll be responsible for the doctrinal development, who'll be responsible for the force structure, who will provide forces, will the forces be on call, will the force be large enough to handle multiple attacks, will force have dedicated lift? The law must contain the long-term structure of the organization. For instance, while it is clear that currently the tactical level forces used to combat and mitigate WMD attacks are largely of Defense Department flavor, that may

not be the long-term final solution. Is highly possible that the nation could, in three to five years, field an on call civilian organization comprised of medical, rescue, and constabulary forces for use in the consequence management domain. The law should further codify the requirements for individuals in the decision-making and execution phases of counter terrorism procedures. Crisis and consequence management leaders and tactical forces should be comprised, in majority, by experienced and trained individuals.

Amongst the most critical problems, associated with any new program, is the procurement and allocation of the funds necessary to ensure that programs success. No matter how well devised, the very best plan will be of little use if there is no money allocated to field the force called for by the review mentioned above. As stated earlier the nation spent over \$2 billion in FY 2000. While this may seem a staggering amount, it was nowhere near the cost to the nation if we develop and field an on call standing crisis management and consequence management force. And while the annual cost will be staggering the cost for being unprepared will be far higher. It would be wonderful if we lived in world without the necessity and costs of our military. Plainly, we do not live in such a world. We live in a dangerous world with dangerous radical states and individuals, and much like the cost of our military we must fully fund our counter/anti WMD programs.

Finally, we must field a force, equipped that force, train that force, and exercise that force. The force needs to be of such a nature they can deploy rapidly anywhere in the world to either prevent and when not possible mitigate the effects of a terrorist WMD assault. The force must be completely versed and proficient in the possible wide ranging

environments to include biological contamination, chemical contamination, and radiological contamination. Further, the force must be capable of deployment and employment at two locations simultaneously. This on call deployability requirement will not be easily filled. However, for the force to be effective it must be available, and it must be able to arrive in a timely manner.

Closing Thought:

A thought echoed in America's national security strategy seems to ring true for the dilemma our nation faces concerning international terrorism and consequence management: "we must prepare for an uncertain future even as today's security problems. We need to look closely at our national security apparatus to ensure its effectiveness by adapting its institutions to meet new challenges. This means we must transform..."⁴²

Definitions:

Complex Contingency Operations: as stated in PDD 39, “peace operations such as the peace accorded implementation operation conducted by NATO in Bosnia (1995 – present) in the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq called Operation Provide Comfort (1991); in the foreign humanitarian assistance operations, such as Operations Support Hope in the central Africa (1994).....”

Consequence Management: "includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. The laws of United States assign primary authority to the states and to those consequences of terrorism."⁴³ Consequence management describes the Ways and Means to alleviate the short and long-term physical, socio- economic, and physical effects of chemical or biological attack. It describes the coordination of local, regional, national, and international assets before, during, and after an attack. Despite five years in the national security language the term consequence management is still ill defined. The lack of a clearly defined definition for this critical doctrinal issue has compounded the difficulties in implementing a sound strategy across governmental agency philosophies and priorities.

Crisis Management: "include measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The laws of the United States assigned primary authority to the federal government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; state and local governments provide assistance as required. Crisis management is predominantly a law-enforcement response. Based on

the situation, a federal crisis management response may be supported by technical operations, and by federal consequence management, which may operate concurrently."⁴⁴

Terrorist Incident: "a violent act, or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."⁴⁵

Weapon of Mass Destruction: "any destructive device as defined in section 921 of this title (which reads) any incendiary, explosive or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, missiles having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than a quarter ounce, mine or device similar to the above (B) poison gas; (C) any weapon involving a disease organism; (D) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life."⁴⁶

Notes

¹ Interview, (Lesley Stahl), with U.S. Counter-Terrorism official Richard Clarke; CBS 60 Minutes; 22 Oct 2000

² A National Security Strategy for a New Century: The White House, December 1999

³ William Cohen; Secretary Of Defense, Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Regarding Defense Challenges for the 21st Century: October 2nd 2000 Washington D.C.

⁴ Statement of Janet Reno Attorney General of the United States before the United States Senate Committee on Appropriations; 4 February 1999

⁵ William Cohen; Secretary Of Defense, Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Regarding Defense Challenges for the 21st Century: October 2nd 2000 Washington D.C.

⁶ National Foundation for Infectious Diseases, 1998 Richard J. Duma/NFID Annual Press Conference and Symposium on Infectious Diseases, Press Release 14 April 1998

⁷ US General Accounting Office; [T-NSIAD-98-164] Combating Terrorism: Observations on Cost Cutting Issues, 7 May 1998

⁸ New York Times; 13 December 1996, p. A 15.

⁹ Senator Richar Lugar (Testimony at the hearings on the Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs), 104th Congress, 2nd session, part III, 27 March, 1996.

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¹¹ Another Perspective on the Domestic Role of the Military and Consequence Management: Chris Seiple, National Interagency Civil-Military Institute, WWW download, 15 Oct 2000

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¹³ Homeland Offense, Balancing and National Strategy; Prevention and Deterrents. ANSER Inc, 11 February 2000

¹⁴ MSNBC, Breakthrough in Yemen probe; 17 Oct 2000

¹⁵ Sun Tzu, The Art of War; Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, 1963

¹⁶ William Cohen; Secretary Of Defense, Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Regarding Defense Challenges for the 21st Century: October 2nd 2000 Washington D.C.

¹⁷ National Security Decision Directive 207; The White House, 1986

¹⁸ Goldwater-Nicholas DOD Reorganization Act; 1986

¹⁹ Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Response Plan, notice of change: FEMA 229, change 11. 7 February 1997

²⁰ Fact Sheet, Managing Complex contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive 56. The White House, May 1997

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²¹ Fact Sheet, Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62. The White House, 22 May 1998

²² Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (title XIV of P.L. 104-201, Sept 23 1996)

²³ Public Law 104 -- 201, Title XIV, "Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction "

²⁴ Statement of Janet Reno Attorney General of the United States before the United States Senate committee on appropriations; 4 February 1999

²⁵ US General Accounting Office; [T-NSIAD-98-164] Combating Terrorism: Observations on Cost Cutting Issues, 7 May 1998

²⁶ Joint Task Force – Civil Support Implementation Plan; United States Atlantic Command, 23 September 1999.

²⁷ National Security Act of 1947

²⁸ A National Security Strategy for a New Century: The White House, December 1999

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³⁰ United States General accounting Office, Combating Terrorism; GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR; 25 June 1999

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³³ Department of Defense and Department of Energy report to Congress: current plans, resources, and capabilities to respond to a nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical terrorist attack April 1996

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⁴⁴ Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Response Plan, notice of change: FEMA 229, change 11. 7 February 1997

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⁴⁶ 18 U.S.C. section 2332a